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The fundamental promise of socialism in China is to provide common prosperity 
for all. However, after 40 years of economic reform since the 1980s, China has become 
one of the most unequal societies in the world. The Five-Year Plan has been one of the 
most important public policy tools of the Chinese government since 1953 to guide the 
nation’s economic and social development. Considering China’s socialism promise, the 
existing social and spatial inequality, and the central importance of the Five-Year Plan, it 
demands a rigorous evaluation of how the issue of inequality between different social 
groups and regions is addressed in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (2016-2020). This 
study fills the gap by critically and systematically analyzing the goals and strategies of 
the national, provincial, and city Thirteenth Five-Year Plans in China. My research 
reveals that China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plans do address the issue of imbalanced 
development. The five-year plans’ social implication is that there are slightly more goals 
and strategies benefiting the capitalist class than the working class. However, neither the 
capitalist nor working class interests dominate the plans and the biggest policy target 
group of the plans is the general public. The five-year plans’ spatial implication is that, 
although spatial issues are not of central importance, there are many more goals and 
strategies benefitting the rural areas than the urban areas and more goals and strategies 
benefitting the Western and Central region than the Eastern region. This finding suggests 
that spatial planning in China prioritizes reducing spatial inequality. Overall, in the 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plans, Chinese governments actively sought to deal with the issue 
of imbalanced development. Theoretically, my research findings strengthen the validity 
 iii 
of the claim that the Chinese capitalist class enjoys political privilege to influence 
policymaking for their own interests. At the same time, my findings support the Marxist 
claim that class struggle plays a vital role in public policymaking in China. However, my 
research findings do not support the claim that the political power of Chinese capitalists 
has been growing since 2010, and do not support the claim that Chinese capitalists are 
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THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT  
 
 
“Philosophical theory itself cannot bring it about that either the barbarizing 
tendency or the humanistic outlook should prevail in the future. However, by 
doing justice to those images and ideas that at given times dominated reality in the 
role of absolutes - e.g., the idea of the individual as it dominated the bourgeois era 
- and that have been relegated in the course of history, philosophy can function as 
a corrective of history, so to speak" (Jay, 1996, p. 329). 
 
The fundamental promise of socialism in China is to provide common prosperity 
for all. However, after 40 years of economic reform since the 1980s, China has become 
one of the most unequal societies in the world (Jain-Chandra et al., 2018). The 
fundamental promise of socialism in China is to provide common prosperity for all. The 
Five-Year Plan has been one of the most important public policy tools of the Chinese 
government since 1953 to guide the nation’s economic and social development. 
Considering China’s socialism promise, the existing social and spatial inequality, and the 
central importance of the Five-Year Plan, it demands a rigorous evaluation of how the 
issue of inequality between different social groups and regions is addressed in the 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (2016-2020). This study fills the gap by critically and 
systematically analyzing the goals and strategies of the national, provincial, and city 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plans in China. Essentially this research investigation aims to do 
justice to China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plan in terms of its implications for the issue of 
social and spatial inequality in China.     
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The Five-Year Plan in China  
The Chinese government has been making Five-Year Plans for Economic and 
Social Development since 1953. Despite the economic reform in 1978 that incorporated 
market mechanisms into the socialist economy, the five-year plans have been playing a 
central role in China’s public policymaking (Heilmann & Melton, 2013). From 1949, 
when People’s Republic of China was founded, to 1978, China’s economy had remained 
socialistic run by the state, and the private sector was either incorporated into the new 
socialist institutions or eliminated. Learning from the Soviet Union’s five-year planning 
model, the First Five-Year Plan was made in 1953 and guided the planned economy. The 
economic goals in the plan prioritized the development of heavy industries such as 
mining, steel manufacturing, and technology which laid foundation for future 
industrialization (Hu et al., 2010). After the success of the first five-year plan, the 
government has kept making five-year plans for the planned economy. The Chinese 
government adopted the economic reform policy in 1978 and gradually transformed the 
centrally planned economy to a mixed economy and opened the door for foreign 
investors. Instead of being abandoned, the five-year plan planning model was gradually 
transformed from its former role of allocating resources to a new role of public affairs 
governance planning. It now mainly serves to coordinate policymaking, mobilize 
resources, and control the economy at the macro level (Hu, 2013). By 2020 the most 
recent five-year plan produced by the Chinese government is the Thirteenth Five-Year 
Plan that was intended to cover the development from 2016 to 2020.  
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The Chinese government published 331 Thirteenth Five-Year Plans in 2016 
including 1 national plan, over 30 provincial plans, and 300 city plans. Given the central 
importance of the five-year plan in public policymaking in China and the proliferation of 
the planning practices, there is still a gap in knowledge about the spatial and social 
implications of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans for different social groups and regions. 
Beside the broad overall official claim that the five-year plan is a reflection of all Chinese 
people’s vision, it is largely unknown how the interests of different social groups and 
regions are reflected in the plans. The formal official mid-term evaluations focused on 
post-implementation results and do not include pre-implementation analysis. In addition, 
the academic research in China on the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans has offered little 
systematic scrutiny of the plans’ goals and strategies in terms of their potential spatial and 
social implications. 
 
The Five-Year Plan and China’s Socialist Development 
Two reasons make filling this knowledge gap important for China’s future 
socialist development. First, the fundamental promise and goal of socialism in China is to 
provide common prosperity for all (Chang, 1996). But now after 40 years of economic 
reform, China has become one of the most unequal societies in the world (Jain-Chandra 
et al., 2018). Thus, it demands a rigorous evaluation of how the issue of inequality 
between different social groups and regions are addressed in the Thirteenth Five-Year 
Plans (2016-2020). After the 1978 economic reform, the Communist Party leader Deng 
Xiaoping argued that common prosperity is the fundamental goal of Chinese socialism 
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(Chang, 1996). Common prosperity refers to the abundance of wealth generated by the 
advancement of productive forces and the public ownership of the wealth (Chang, 1996). 
It means the elimination of poverty and extreme inequality between the rich and the poor. 
It envisions a society where most people can live a good life. However, common 
prosperity does not necessarily entail an egalitarian society. Deng Xiaoping (1986) said 
that “our policy is to let some people and some regions get rich first, so that they can lead 
and help the lagging regions. It’s the leading regions’ obligation to help the lagging ones” 
when he met the Prime Minister of New Zealand. The Communist Party leaders after 
Deng have all supported the reform policy. Despite the government’s promise of 
common prosperity, extreme income and wealth inequality have taken root in China. Xi 
Jinping (2017) the President of China, emphasized during the 
19th National Congress Meeting of the Communist Party, the principal social 
contradiction of China now lies between people’s ever-growing demands for better lives 
and imbalanced and insufficient development. Briefly summarized, imbalanced 
development refers to economic disparities between the rural and urban regions, between 
the eastern, and western and central regions, and the income and wealth gap between the 
rich and the poor in China. Therefore, it is essential to evaluate how the five-year plans 
address the issue of imbalanced growth and whether or not the plans are fulfilling the 
government’s promise of common prosperity for all.  
Second, with the maturing of the market economy and the ever-growing private 
sector in China, achieving common prosperity could face serious obstacles. In 2018, the 
private sector in China contributed over 60 percent of the national GDP and brought in 
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over 50% of the governmental fiscal revenue (Meng, 2018). A large portion of China’s 
national economy now is controlled by the private sector.  Chen et al. (2008) argued that 
according to their survey, the capitalists in China were able to transform their economic 
power into formal political power. The power imbalance between capitalists and other 
social groups such as the working class could lead to domination of capitalists in politics 
and prevent equitable policymaking. Forester (1982) argued that in developed capitalist 
countries, progressive planners need to be able to recognize systematic sources of 
misinformation and structural imbalances of power among different social groups during 
planning process.  Groups such as industrial capitalists and property developers, they tend 
to be more powerful in terms of their ability to influence political decisions. Their ability 
to manipulate public discourse and take advantage of public resources for their own 
interests have been well recorded (Stoecker, 2010). It was argued that “the sum total of 
these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real 
foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure” (Marx & Engles, 1958, p. 
362). With the private sector playing a more and more important role in resource 
allocation in China, in many places the economic base has been shifted from the former 
socialistic one to now capitalistic. Despite the different interpretations of Marx and 
Engels’s “base-superstructure” thesis (Smith, 1984), the well-agreed argument is that 
with the change in the economic base or national economy, the superstructure including 
public policy making, could be changed accordingly. China’s recent anti-corruption 
campaign (Pan & Tian, 2017) proves the tight connection between the corrupted officials 
and business groups. The large number of party officials prosecuted and punished during 
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Xi’s administration shows how widespread the issue has been. The private sector has had 
great influence on China’s politics.   
To sum up, the private sector in China has been growing since the 1978 economic 
reform. The business groups have had great influenced in China’s politics and the power 
imbalance between the rich and the poor is very likely to thwart the plan for common 
prosperity. Thus, it is important to systematically check and make sure the five-year plans 
are true reflections of the socialist vision, rather than the ones that are in favor of the 
more powerful capitalist elites. 
 
Research Questions  
1. Is the issue of imbalanced development addressed in China’s Thirteenth Five-
Year Plans at national, provincial and city level? If yes, through what goals and strategies 
as listed in the plans?  
2. What are the relationships between the goals presented in China’s Thirteenth 
Five-Year Plan, and imbalanced development? Do the goals in the national, provincial 
and city plans tend to reduce, maintain, or reinforce different aspects of imbalanced 
development in China?  
3. Does the capitalist class benefit more in China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plans 
than the working class in the national, provincial, and city plans?  
4. Does the capitalist class benefit more in China’s Thirteenth National Five-Year 
Plan than in the Twelfth National Five-Year Plan? 
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5. Does the capitalist class tend to benefit more in the five-year plans in the city 
plans than in the national and provincial five-year plans?  
 
Research Significance 
The fundamental promise of socialism in China is to provide common prosperity 
for all. However, after 40 years of economic reform since the 1980s, China has become 
one of the most unequal societies in the world (Jain-Chandra, et al., 2018). Five-Year 
Plan has been one of the most important public policy tools of the Chinese government 
since 1953 to guide the nation’s social and economic development. Considering China’s 
socialism promise, the existing social and spatial inequality, and the central importance of 
the Five-Year Plan, it demands academic attention to examine how the issue of inequality 
between different social groups and regions are addressed in the Thirteenth Five-Year 
Plans (2016-2020). This study fills the gap by critically and systematically analyzing the 
goals and strategies of the national, provincial, and city Thirteenth Five-Year Plans in 
China. Essentially this research investigation aims to do justice to China’s Thirteenth 
Five-Year Plan in terms of its implications for the issue of social and spatial inequality.  
My research aims to make four major contributions: First, theoretically, by 
evaluating multiple plans, on the one hand, the research will produce a micro theory of 
Chinese government’s social action which explicates the social and spatial implications 
of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans; on the other hand, it will provide empirical evidence to 
shine light on extant theories of Chinese capitalists’ political participation; Second, 
practically, the research findings can be used by Chinese citizens to demand the social 
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chang related to five-year plans such as more participation in the plan making; the 
findings can be used by the organizations and individuals involved in the plan making to 
reflect on their own practices because my research provides a unique perspective to 
examine the five-year plans; the findings can also be used by scholars who study Chinese 
history because my research investigates and describes historical documents, the 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plans. Third, my research contributes to plan evaluation literature 
by providing an example of advocacy planning evaluation and connecting plan evaluation 
results to other social theories. Last but not the least, methodologically, the research will 
serve as an example of critical evaluation of socio-economic plans and pave the way for 
































The Existence of Imbalanced Development in China 
Xi’s administration in 2017 declared that China’s principal social contradiction 
now lies between people’s ever-growing demands for better lives and imbalanced and 
insufficient development. The imbalanced development is defined mainly in two aspects, 
spatial inequality, and income and wealth inequality (Xi, 2017). Spatial inequality refers 
to the huge economic disparity between the urban and the rural regions, and between 
eastern, and western and central regions. Income and wealth inequality refer to the huge 
gap in income and accumulated wealth between the rich and the poor, as measured by the 
Gini coefficient. 
In China, urban residents’ disposable income per capita is almost 3 times as much 
as rural residents’ disposable income per capita in 2015 (Jiang & Zhou, 2018). Despite 
the rural residents’ slightly faster income growth, the gap has remained large in 2015.  
 






























Income of the 
Urban and Rural  
(nominal)(Times) 
2013 4268.9 1520.8 100.0 100.0 2.807 
2014 4652.2 1691.7 109.0 111.2 2.750 
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2015 4967.3 1821.6 117.9 121.1 2.731 
 
(CSY, 2016, p.171)  
 
 
Spatial inequality can also be observed in the inequality between the eastern, 
central, and western regions.  Though the GDP and income per capita gaps between the 
three regions have been decreasing, the gaps are still significant (Liao & Wei, 2016). In 
2015, the eastern region accounts for 51.6% of the national GDP, with urban residents’ 
annual disposable income of 5918 dollars (36691 yuan, in Chinese currency) and rural 
2306 dollars (14297 yuan); the central region, which included north-eastern region, 
28.3% of the national GDP, with urban residents’ annual disposable income of 4372 
dollars (27105 yuan) and rural 1807 dollars (11205 yuan); while the western region 
accounts for 20.1% of the national GDP, with urban residents’ annual disposable income 
of 4264 dollars (26437 yuan) and rural 1467 dollars (9093 yuan).  
 
Table 2.1 The Key Economic Indexes of Eastern, Central and Western Regions in 2015 
 
 Eastern Central  Western  
(Regional GDP) / 
(National GDP) (%) 
51.6 28.3 20.1 
Urban residents’ 
annual disposable 
income per capita 
(U.S. Dollar) 
5918 4372 4264 
Rural residents’ 
annual disposable 
2306 1807 1467 
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income per capita 
(U.S. Dollar) 
 
(CSY, 2016, p.842) 
 
 
(Liao & Wei, 2016, p. 1) reviewed the last three decades’ literature (1980-2010) 
on China’s regional development and arrived at the conclusion that “recent studies have 
reached a consensus that the coastal-inland divide has largely been widened during the 
reform period.” The coastal region refers to the eastern region and inland region refers to 
the central and western region. They argued that interregional inequality between the 
three regions consistently increased from 1952 to 2013. “Values of the Theil index, CV, 
and the Gini coefficient increased by 798%, 284%, and 276% during the period of 1952-
2013” (Liao & Wei, 2016, p. 7). Theil index, Coefficient of Variation (CV), and the Gini 
coefficient have been widely used to measure regional economic inequality. CV is a 
dispersion index and the computed results are sensitive to outliers. The Gini coefficients 
are calculated based on a Lorenz Curve and the results can be easily confounded by high 
values (Fan & Sun, 2008). The Theil index, a type of entropy indices, has the advantage 
that “can be decomposed into additive terms that depict the inequality among and within 
groups of elements in a system” (Fan & Sun, 2008, p. 6) 
Yang (2014) compared the contribution of the three regions to China’s national 
GDP from 1980 to 2012 and argued that despite slight changes, the disparity between the 
three regions remains significant. For example, in 1980, the eastern region’s GDP 
accounted for 52.32% of the national GDP and the central region, 32.21% and the 
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western region, 16.47%; by 2012, the percentages are 55.63%, 24.37%, and 20%. The 
quotient between the eastern and central region increased from 1.68 in 1980 to 2.26 in 
2012; the eastern and western quotient decreased from 3.18 in 1980 to 2.82 in 2012.  
In addition to the increased spatial imbalance in China, the imbalance between 
income and wealth of the rich and the poor has been getting worse since the 1980s’ 
economic reform. Income and wealth inequality is generally measured by income and 
wealth Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient values from 0.4 to 0.5 are considered as 
indicators of huge disparity between the rich and the poor. And the ones bigger than 0.5 
show extreme inequalities.  
The consensus among scholars is that the income Gini coefficient, before the 
1978’s economic reform, is no greater than 0.2 (Yang, 2014). During the early 1980s, it 
rose to 0.28; 1995, 0.38; and 2000, 0.458 (Yang, 2014). Each year’s income Gini 
coefficient in the first decade of the 2000s was greater than 0.47. In 2013, the Gini 
coefficient reached 0.473 which was higher than 90% of all the countries in the world 
(Yang, 2014). The wealth Gini coefficient’s increase was even more dramatic than the 
income coefficient because wealth tends to be accumulated through time. From 2002 to 
2012, the wealth Gini coefficient had grown from 0.387 to 0.739 (Li, 2018). It indicates 
that the top 1% rich in China holds over 33% of the nation’s wealth. This is striking 
because the high inequality was reached in only ten years.  
 
 13 
Five-Year Plan Research in China  
The literature lacks critical perspectives  
Given the significant and increasing spatial, income, and wealth inequality in 
China and the central role played by the Five-Year Plan in China’s social and economic 
development, it is reasonable to ask the question how the issue of imbalanced 
development is addressed in the most recent Five-Year Plans, the Thirteenth Five-Year 
Plans (2016-2020).  Unfortunately, the answer was not found in the current Five-Year 
Plan literature. The plan evaluation literature primarily compares what is in the plan and 
what has happened in reality after implementation, and pays little attention to the plan 
content itself (Gu & Wang, 2014). The dominant evaluation approach is rational and 
conformance-based. The potential economic and social implications entailed in the 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plans have escaped the academic scrutiny in China.  
After reviewing the Five-Year Plan mid-term evaluation literature, Hao (2013, p. 
61) argued that plan evaluation in the Chinese context involves examining 
 
 “target and goal completion, planning indexes progression, plan implementation, 
characteristics of regional plans, main progresses made, main problems run into, 
planning experiences, and future development strategies”.  
 
This evaluation approach offers little critical analysis of the plan’s goals and their 
potential implications for different regions and groups. Yan and Wang (2012) reviewed 
China’s Five-Year Plan research and concluded that overall, past evaluation research 
lacks rational analysis and quantitative approaches. They conducted a quantitative 
evaluation of China’s 11th National Five-Year Plan measuring the conformity between 
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the plan’s goals and what had happened after implementation. The study acknowledged 
that one of the key shortcomings of the study was that it failed to examine the legitimacy 
of the plan’s goals. Hai (2016) evaluated several city five-year plans in Henan Province 
comparing the five-year plans’ indicator system with national and provincial systems.  
Hai (2016) argued that the design of Henan’s fiver-year plans’ indicator systems was not 
rational enough. Because on the one hand, policy makers needed more concrete analysis 
of local economies especially the extent of local industrialization. On the other hand, the 
planning process lacked the efforts to connect local conditions to national policies.  
The Evolution of the Five-Year Plan in China   
Despite the lack of critical research on the Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, scholars 
have been writing about the evolution of previous five-year plans. In the past seventy 
years of development, China’s Five-Year Plan has gone through huge transitions. The 
literature provides strong evidence that the five-year plan has had substantial impacts on 
China’s regional disparities. These effects support the necessity of evaluating how the 
issue of imbalance had been addressed by previous five-year plans.  
Wu (2016) argued that before the 1980s, inland areas, the central and western 
region of China, were prioritized by the planning policy for national industrial 
development (Falkenheim, 1985). Raw material access and national defense were among 
key considerations for the decision (Riskin, 1987). 
However, after the 1980s, under the guidance of economic reform and opening-up 
policy, the eastern region became the main beneficiary of government planning which led 
to huge inequalities between the eastern and other regions. The eastern coastal region 
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attracted most domestic and foreign investments. Almost all of economic experiment 
zones were located in coastal regions such as the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone.1 Wu 
argued (2016, p.48) that “the country has gradually turned away from the centrally 
planned economic system to the market-orientated economic system (Kanbur and Zhang, 
2005; Zhang & Zou, 2012).” Wu (2016) also pointed out three shifts of the five-year 
planning system 
 
“a shift of focus from the previous quantity of economic output to the present 
quality of economic development; A transformation from the previous focus on 
the isolated development mode to the coordinated development mode; A 
transformation from previous Government-dominated planning to current 
Government-led planning with public participation (p.48-49).” 
 
Planning policy emphasis has been changed from promoting the eastern coastal 
region to a more coordinated regional development framework since the late 1990s. Thus, 
the disparity between eastern and others regions began to be addressed in five-year plans. 
However, the thirteenth five-year plans’ social and regional implications have not been 
covered in the literature. The main characteristics and regional implications of China’s 
previous five-year plans (1950-2014) were summarized by Wu (2016, p.41-65) as 
follows.  
(1) Centralized planning period (1953-1980): 
 
1 A special economic zone is an area where market mechanism is introduced and private business is 
encouraged. The area overall is planned to attract foreign investments with benefits such as cheap land and 
tax exemption or reduction.  
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First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957): The First Five-Year Plan marked the beginning 
of China’s socialist modernization and industrialization. The main beneficiary of the 
national development policies was the north-eastern part of China which is a part of the 
central region (Wu, 2016). The region was selected primarily because of its inland 
location (a national defense strategy), industrial foundation, access to raw materials, and 
proximity to the Soviet Union. Wu (2016, p.42) argued that the region “enjoyed more 
than one-quarter of total capital construction investment in the country, including new 
factory constructions centering on metallurgy, coal, machinery and other heavy-industry 
sectors.” However, China still was one of the most egalitarian societies at the time 
(Zhang & Zou, 2012). Because capitalist class was eliminated and all workers’ wages 
were not significantly different.  
Second Five-Year Plan (1958–1962):  Considering the prioritization of the inland 
regions during the first five-year plan, the government adjusted its policies and started to 
distribute more resources to the coastal regions as well. But the plan was suspended in 
1962 mainly because of the Great Leap Forward movement which set impossible goals 
and caused a decline in national productivity.  
Third Five-Year-Plan (1965-1970): The biggest winners in the third five-year plan 
were still the inland regions. Wu (2016) argued that the plan had three major goals: One 
was to guarantee the production of food; another was to strengthen national defense; and 
the last, to develop infrastructures, education, and culture. With the threat of coming 
wars, the Chinese government strategically located key industries and infrastructures 
 17 
projects in inland areas. Coastal regions are comparably more vulnerable to potential air 
strikes than the western inland regions.  The so called Third-tier regions,  
 
“covers 13 provinces and other relevant areas, including most provinces in the 
western region, such as Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, 
Qinghai, as well as some mountainous areas in the central region, such as Shanxi, 
Henan, Hunan, Hubei, Guangdong and Guangxi provinces” (Wu, 2016, p.44) 
 
Fourth (1971-1975) and Fifth Five-Year-Plan (1976-1980): The fourth and the 
fifth five-year plan proposed a decentralizing strategy and divided China into different 
economic regions such as north-eastern, south western and central regions (Wu, 2016). 
Each region was encouraged to developed their own industrial systems. China was one of 
the most egalitarian societies until the 1967’s decentralization policy (Zhang & Zou, 
2012). Wu (2016, p.46) cited two studies to confirm this divergence which emerged 
during the 1960s. The first one is study of inter-provincial economic disparities and the 
other one is Kanbur and Zhang’s (2005) study of regional inequality in China. Kanbur 
and Zhang (2005) argued that significant regional inequality did not emerge in China 
until the 1960s.  
 In summary, from the first to fifth five-year plans, inland regions had been the 
main beneficiaries of national investment. Naughton (1988) argued that the inland 
regions received about two-thirds of government investments during the early socialist 
construction and millions of skilled workers lived near these factories. However, the 
living standards between different regions were not significantly different because of the 
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similar wages and similar level of consumer goods production. But this prioritization of 
the Third-tier regions was soon to be changed. 
(2) The early reform and opening-up period (1980-1990):  
Sixth (1981-1985) and Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-1990): The coastal regions 
became the major beneficiaries of the new policy of reform and opening-up. Most public 
investments and private investments, domestic and foreign, were concentrated in coastal 
regions where new economic development zones were set up.  
Wu’s summary (2016, p.60) of the Sixth and Seventh Five-Year Plans is worth 
quoting here. In the Seventh Five-Year-Plan (1986–1990), the Chinese Government 
proposed that  
 
“speed[ing] up the development of the eastern coastal regions, focus[ing] on 
energy and raw material development in central regions, and actively prepar[ing] 
for further development of the western regions…….To be specific, support for 
economic development was given to the eastern region and portal cities rather 
than to industrial cities in inland areas and the Third-tier region. On the whole, the 
main theme of the country’s planning policies shifted from preparing for 
industrial output against war and natural disasters towards stimulating economic 
growth in coastal regions. From the Sixth to the Seventh Five-Year-Plan, there 
was an obvious increase in the government investment ratio into the eastern 
region and portal cities. With the ‘visible’ support of planning policies, new 
spatial disparities emerged.”  
 
(3) Market-oriented planning system (1991-2000): 
Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991-1995) and Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000): 
Facing the widening economic gap between the East and West, and between the urban 
and rural areas, the two five-year plans both emphasized the goal of coordinated 
development which was meant to deal with the growing regional disparities (Wu, 2016). 
 19 
However, despite the governmental incentives and the relocated investments and 
industries to the west and central regions, the regional disparities still increased and 
reached its peak height around 2005 as demonstrated by Liao et al., (2016). Wu (2016, 
p.74) argued that “as a ‘pioneering development’ region, the eastern region attracted all 
the necessary production factors to stimulate its regional economic growth.”  
In the coastal regions, growth-poles, central coastal cities, province capital cities 
and key periphery towns were set up as the engines of the regions.  
(4) Contemporary planning policies (2001–2014):  
Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001-2005), Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) and 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015): the Chinese Government kept pushing the 
coordinated development principle during this time. The guiding planning principles for 
the three periods of five-year plans stayed stable. Key implemented regional planning 
programs were: “the development of the western region, the revitalization of north-
eastern region and other old industrial bases, the rise of the central region, and the 
pioneering development of the eastern region, aimed at narrowing the development gap 
between regions” (Wu, 2016, p.83).  
The eastern region was supported to upgrade their industrial structures and 
prioritize high tech and high value-added industries.  The western and central region were 
planned to assume more roles of manufacturing and raw material production (Wu, 2016).  
The economic gap between different regions had been slightly narrowed. But the 
forces of agglomeration in wealthier regions remain powerful. Despite government 
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incentives and investments to promote the development in the west and the central 
regions, the economic disparities are likely to continue (Wu, 2016). 
In summary, five-years plans have had great influence in China’s social and 
economic development. The issue of imbalanced development has started to be addressed 
since the Eighth Five-Year Plan. However, extant five-year plan research offers little 
critical and systematic scrutiny of the implications of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans for 
different regions and social groups. It’s not clear whether and how the issue of 
imbalanced development is addressed in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans at national, 
provincial and city level in China. This lack of knowledge poses the danger of failing to 
fulfill the socialist promise of common prosperity for all, which runs against the 
fundamental promise of the government. 
The Process of making Five-Year Plans 
The making of the five-year plans at national, provincial, and city level follows a 
similar general process, preparation and research phase, the making of the five-year plan 
proposal phase, and the making of the five-year plan (guideline text) phase (Ding, 2018; 
Hu, 2011). Despite being carried out by different organizations at different levels of 
Chinese governments, the three-phase plan making is upheld across the three levels of 
five-year plans.  
At the national level, the first phase of plan making is preparation and research 
phase. The process starts with mid-term evaluation of the last national five-year plan led 
by National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) which is one of the 
departments of the State Council. The evaluation lays foundation for the upcoming 
 21 
preparation and research.  A yearlong preparation and research are mainly comprised of 
baseline information collection and completion of major research projects. The National 
Development and Reform Commission is the main organization that leads the mission. 
For example, 39 major research projects were revealed by the commission for public 
competition for the preparation of the Twelfth National Five-Year Plan. Over 60 research 
organizations were selected and thousands of researchers participated the projects (Hu, 
2011). Based on the preparation and research, NDRC drafts the Basic Ideas for next five-
year plan. This draft will be reviewed and commented by experts from different 
ministries of the State Council and also leaders and experts from different provinces. The 
final drat will be submitted to the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the 
State Council. Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 
Communist Party including the President of China are in charge of reviewing the Basic 
Ideas, circulating of the draft, building political census, and political mobilization (Hu, 
2011).   
The second phase of the five-year plan making is drafting the proposal for 
national five-year plan. Under the leadership of the members of the Standing Committee 
of the Political Bureau of the Party, NDRC and the research agencies of the State Council 
start to draft the five-year plan proposal. At the same time, five-year plans of different 
ministries of the State Council, of the provinces and cities are being made. These 
ministry, province, and city plans are used to support the making of the national five-year 
plan. Members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, members 
of the Standing Committee of the People's Political Consultative Conference, selected 
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research organizations, and think tanks will all contribute to the draft (Hu, 2011). Once a 
good of draft of the proposal is completed, it will be sent out to different ministries, 
provinces, the Communist Party members, other independent party member, and the 
public for reviewing and comments. After multiple times of reviewing, revising, 
reviewing, and revising, the final draft of the proposal will be submitted to the annual 
Fifth Plenum of the Communist Party of China Central Committee for approval.  
The last phase of national five-year plan making is to produce a plan guideline 
text. With the foundation of the proposal, the first draft of the guidelines will be produced 
by NDRC. Before sending the final draft to National People’s Congress for approval, 
NDRC organizes multiple sessions for industry associations, ministries at different levels 
of governments, national commission of planning experts, and the general public to 
provide feedbacks. After approved by the State Council and 
the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party, it turns to 
National People’s Congress to review and approve the final draft.   
The provincial and city plans are made in the similar process as the national plans. 
Instead of the National Development and Reform Commission, it’s the Provincial and 
City Development and Reform Commission that take the responsibility of drafting. The 
provincial and city governments organize and coordinate the whole plan making process. 
The completed draft is sent to Provincial and City People’s Congress for approval.  
Chinese scholars argued that this three-phase plan making process is collective, 
participatory, and deliberative (see Ding, 2018; Hu et al., 2017; Meng, 2014; Hu, 2011). 
The decision makers in the process are very diverse groups and the decisions are made 
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collectively and deliberatively. For example, involved organizations include the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party, the State Council, People’s Congress, People’s 
Political Consultative Conference commission, independent research groups, and 
planning expert commission. The reviewing and revising process during the drafting is 
repetitive and deliberative. Wide ranges of organizations and opinions are consulted, 
considered, and incorporated in the plan (Hu et al., 2017). Ding (2018) recorded and 
analyzed the roles of the main participants in a district five-year plan making process. 
Like the making of the national five-year plan, the district government including leading 
officials, the City Development and Reform Commission, other departments, and the 
street level staff, was mainly responsible for organizing, coordinating, and drafting. The 
committee of District People’s Congress and People’s Political Consultative Conference 
supported and approved the five-year plan. Experts offered intellectual assistance during 
the research, reviewing, revising, and decision-making process. The last group of 
participants analyzed by Ding (2018) were interest groups. There were representatives 
from business, higher education, independent parties, and the general public. All of the 
representative attended meetings with the government except the general public. The 
participating mechanisms for the general public were mainly based on internet.  
Despite the claim that the five-year plan making process is participatory and 
inclusive, the general public still lack appropriate mechanisms to participate in the five-
year plan making (Ding, 2017). The plan making process is indeed participatory and 
inclusive for different governmental organizations, party elites, technical experts, 
business representatives, and People’s Congress representatives. However, it’s still 
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challenging for the general public to exert influence during the plan making. The 
mechanisms for the public to get involved is mainly limited to internet channels such as 
emails and social media platforms. As showed by Ding, the business groups had face-to-
face meetings with the district officials and the meeting generated 16 modification 
suggestions for the district five-year plan while the general public never met any officials 
and no suggestions generated. This case study evidences the political power imbalance 
(Forester, 1988) between the capitalists and the general public. It’s has not been 
examined in the five-year plan literature that whether this power imbalance could distort 
the plan to favor the interests of the capitalist class.  
 
Plan Evaluation and A Critical Plan Evaluation Study 
Planning Evaluation Background 
Scholars have paid attention to plan or planning evaluation since the Second 
World War with the rise of rational planning paradigm (Oliveira & Pinho, 2010). The 
evolution of plan evaluation theory and practice has been approximately paralleled with 
the evolution of planning theory (Khakee, 1998). Evaluating plans or planning is to tell 
the good ones from the bad ones. In order to make such judgments, the first step is to 
define what planning is or to argue what planning should be (Alexander & Faludi, 1989). 
This task is primarily dealt with in the literature of planning theory. There is a consensus 
in the planning field that the planning paradigm has shifted from rational planning to 
communitive planning (Healey, 1996). For example, Oliveira and Pinho (2010, p.344) 
presented the evolution of planning approaches summarized by Innes (1995): “rational-
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comprehensive planning, incremental planning, advocacy planning, implementation-
oriented planning, strategic planning, transactive planning, negotiative planning, and 
communicative planning”. Correspondingly, plan evaluation approaches went from the 
dominance of rational evaluation, to communicative evaluation, and to pragmatic and 
integrated evaluation (Guyadeen & Seasons, 2016). These approaches are 
complementary to each other and not in conflict. Different approaches could be followed 
in a single evaluation study (Alexander & Faludi, 1989). Detailed descriptions of the 
approaches will be provided later.  
 (1) Lack of Advocacy Planning Evaluation  
Despite the growing research interest in plan evaluation in the 21st century, two 
issues demand more academic attention. First, compared with other plan evaluation 
approaches, the advocacy planning approach has not been well explored. Davidoff (1965) 
was the champion of advocacy planning and he argued that during the planning process, 
different social groups might not be equally represented and heard. The groups of lower 
socioeconomic status are often less represented and left unheard. Thus, planners should 
represent the poor and the vulnerable groups who cannot compete with the rich and the 
powerful such as developers and bankers without extra supports. For this approach, good 
planning is the ones that give extra help to the poor and the vulnerable groups and make 
sure they are well represented, heard, and that their interests are safeguarded in plans.  
However, none of the three main approaches to plan evaluation as mentioned 
above emphasizes the importance of equal representation and fair decision-making during 
planning process. Rational planners argued that plans should be made to control the 
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future and they are the blueprint of future arrangements. (Wildavsky, 1973; Laurian et 
al.,2004). Guyadeen and Seasons (2016, p.218) argued that “the success of (rational) 
planning is judged by the degree of conformance between outcomes on-the-ground and 
planning policy prescriptions, and the promotion of planning goals and objectives 
through available implementation instruments”. Talen (1996) believed that more research 
needs to be devoted to plan implementation because it’s important for planners and the 
public to understand whether planning and plans are making desired changes in the real 
world. In addition to the blueprint argument, Alexander (1981) argued that rational 
planning seeks to develop optimal strategies to achieve desired goals. Proposed strategies 
in plans must be demonstrated as superior to their alternatives (Faludi, 1986). The main 
evaluation criterion for this aspect of rational planning is how well the superiority of the 
proposed strategies are justified. For example, the Cost-Benefit Analysis, Planning 
Balance Sheet Analysis, and Goal Achievement Matrix are typical tools used to seek 
optimality during planning. The two evaluation criteria of rational planning, conformance 
and optimality, have nothing to do with equal representation and fair decision-making.  
Communitive planning evaluation is performance-based and focuses on planning 
process (Guyadeen & Seasons, 2016). Faludi (1987) argued that the idea of plans as 
blueprint to control the future ignores inevitable uncertainties and changes that happen 
during the planning process and that is unrealistic. Faludi (1987, p.116-137) proposed 
that planning should strive to create a reference for agencies’ operational decisions, 
meaning the decision that “represent the commitment to action by the decision-making 
agent or through which the decision agent deploys other organizations or units in 
 27 
planning or implementation activities”. Good planning and plans are thus, the ones that 
are most useful for decisions makers to achieve desired ends such as proceeding of daily 
operations or achieving long-term goals. This proposal of plan evaluation also ignores 
equal representation and fair decision-making for different plan-making participants.  
The pragmatic integrated evaluation approach argues that considering complex 
nature of planning activity and widely different contexts of planning, there is no single 
evaluation approach that suits all situations (Guyadeen & Seasons, 2016). Different plans 
are designed to fulfill different functions. The most appropriate evaluation approach 
should be used according to the specific contexts. For example, Hoch (2002) argued that 
planners should not emphasize rational analysis when evaluating planning because 
rational approach tends to ignore planning contexts and prevent stakeholders from 
reflecting, deliberating, and learning during planning evaluation. For a pragmatic and 
integrated planning evaluation, good planning is the ones that solve problems, suit 
specific planning contexts, promote democratic participation and mutual learning, and 
provide opportunities for shared deliberation. This approach touches on participation but 
the relative vulnerability of the poor and the disadvantaged is not emphasized.  
In addition to the three main evaluation approaches, another line of research that 
has been gaining more planning scholars’ research interests since the 1990s is plan 
quality evaluation (Berke & Kaiser, 2006; Berke & Godschalk, 2009). Lyles and Stevens 
(2014) argued that by 2014, the plan quality literature has generated more than forty-five 
peer-reviewed publications and the growth speed of the literature is accelerating. This 
approach can be included in the rational planning approach because it seeks the 
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optimality in plan making in terms of plan text arrangements. For example, Guyadeen 
(2019, p.3) argued that “plan quality studies tend to focus on determining whether plans 
are factually comprehensive, have goals that are informed by analysis, and include 
appropriate policies to help achieve goals.” However, Connell and Daoust-Filiatrault 
(2018) argued that plan quality evaluation is a distinct type of plan evaluation because it 
focuses specifically on written plans and evaluates the power of plans to produce an 
effect as it is embodied in plan texts.  
Studies that follow the plan quality evaluation approach share similar 
constructions of evaluative criteria and all use content analysis as data analysis method. 
Even though this approach focuses on plan contents, fair distribution of planning benefits 
has not been well evaluated. This component has rarely been included in the plan quality 
evaluative criteria. Only in studies that specifically aim to evaluate how equitable the 
plans are can a fair distribution of planning benefits be found. But compared with other 
evaluative approaches, they are relatively rare (See Fainstein, 2014; Berke et al., 2019; 
Shahab et al., 2019).  
(2) Lack of Connection to other Social Theories 
Second, plan evaluation research findings have not been well connected to other 
social theories. The utilization of plan evaluation research has been limited mainly in the 
field of planning or evaluation. Planning products are inherently produced by collective 
and political processes and can be analyzed and connected to higher levels of social 
theories. But few studies attempt to make the connection.  
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My research contributes to plan evaluation literature by providing an example of 
advocacy planning evaluation and connecting plan evaluation results to other social 
theories. First, the evaluation proposed in my research can be seen as an example of 
advocacy planning evaluation. China’s Socialism promise of common prosperity for all 
aims to help the poor and the vulnerable groups and reduce the economic gap between 
them and the rich. It is in line with the core tenets of advocacy planning. Planning 
products including official plans in China, therefore, should reflect the interests of the 
poor and the vulnerable and be designed to narrow economic gaps. My evaluation will 
check whether the five-year plans address the economic gaps between different social 
groups and regions. It serves as an example of advocacy planning evaluation that focuses 
on plan texts. It is critical in the sense that the official claims and evaluations of the five-
year plans are not taken for granted. Without systematically examining the content of the 
five-year plans, oppressive and exploitive arrangements could escape people’s attention 
and prevent them from challenging existing oppression and exploitation. Second, my 
evaluation results will present how different social groups’ interests are reflected in 
Chinese five-year plans. This presentation connects my research findings to social 
theories of Chinese capitalist’s political participation. This connection expands the 




Theories of political participation of capitalists in China 
Most studies on Chinese capitalists, or entrepreneurs, have argued that in China, 
capitalists or entrepreneurs are gaining more political influence since the 1990s at all 
levels of government, but especially at the local level (see Schubert & Heberer, 2017; 
Hong, 2015; Guangjin, 2013; Sol, 2013; Kennedy , 2009; Chen et al., 2008; Dickson, 
2007; Guiheux, 2006; Heberer, 2003).   
Before the 2010s, scholars generally agreed that capitalists in China were loyal 
and compliant patterners of the State and enjoyed privileged access to influence 
policymaking (Schubert & Heberer, 2017). Instead of confronting and challenging the 
leadership of the Communist Party, they worked within political and economic system 
and profited together with the party leaders (Dickson, 2008; Guiheux, 2006). Guiheux 
(2006, p.232) argued that “most individuals and groups do not seek autonomy but rather 
closer embeddedness with the state……. Government-business relations in China, as in 
much of East Asia, and in sharp contrast to many Western countries, are more 
cooperative than antagonistic.” Guiheux (2006) also pointed out that these close 
government-business relations gave capitalists privileged access to policy makers while 
other groups such as farmers, consumers, and laid-off workers hardly shared this 
opportunity. Chen et al. (2008) quantitatively examined which factors tend to be 
associated with entrepreneurs’ behavior of political participation defined as being a 
member of Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference or People’s Congress. 
Chen et al. (2008, p.298) concluded that their research provides empirical evidence that 
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“Chinese entrepreneurs are translating their economic power, political identity, and 
household background into formal political power”.  Li et al. (2013) observed that with 
the improvement of their economic and social status, capitalists’ political awareness and 
participation has been increasing. For example, Li et al. (2013, p.332) showed that  
 
“during the 1993–2008 period, the proportion of private entrepreneurs who are 
CPC members has shown a rising trend. Among those surveyed in 2008, CPC 
members accounted for 33.4%, 20 percentage points higher than that in 1993, 
registering an impressive 151% growth.”  
 
Kennedy (2009) argued that as a result of the marketization of China’s economy, 
extensive lobbying by capitalists emerged. Schubert and Heberer (2017, p.99) argued 
that, after 2010, with the deepening of marketization and market maturing, “power 
relations between the party-state and private entrepreneurs have gradually been 
‘reconfigured’ or ‘recalibrated’…… Private entrepreneurs are arguably gaining political 
influence at all administrative levels in the Chinese political system”. The growing speed 
of China’s national economy has slowed down from 2007’s 14.2% annually to 2016’s 
6.7%. Governments at all levels are experiencing the pressure from national economic 
restructuring. Public officials depend more and more on the private sector to achieve 




My research’s contribution to the theories 
The primary goal of my research is not to test or expand the theories of Chinese 
capitalists. However, by showing how the capitalist and working class benefit differently 
from the Twelfth (2011-2015) and Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (2016-2020) in the 
national, provincial, and city plans, the research will provide empirical evidence that 
supports or challenges the theories. If there are more goals and strategies in these five-
year plans that tend to benefit the capitalist class more than the working class, then my 
research findings will strengthen the validity of extant theoretical claims that the Chinese 
capitalist class enjoys political privilege to influence policymaking for their own interests 
over other groups. If compared with the twelfth five-year plans, capitalists are gaining 
more benefits in the thirteenth five-year plans, then my research supports extant 
theoretical claims that Chinese capitalists’ political power is growing. If the capitalists 
tend to enjoy more support in the city plans than in the provincial and national plans, then 
my research supports the extant argument that the capitalists are more active at the local 
level to safeguard and expand their interests in China.  
 
The theories’ implications for my research 
The theories of Chinese capitalists suggest that the capitalists’ political influence 
has been growing since the 1990s and they are gaining more power especially after 2010 
at local level. But at the same time, other groups such as famers, workers, and consumers 
never had similar political privilege to participate in politics as the capitalists. Thus, 
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according to the theories, it is reasonable to first assume that in the twelfth and thirteenth 
five-year plans, capitalists benefit more than other groups. Second compared with the 
twelfth five-year plans, the capitalists are likely to gain more benefits in the thirteenth 
five-year plan. At last, the capitalists tend to gain more benefits in the city plans than in 
the national and provincial plans because city level is generally considered as local.  
 
A Marxist Analysis of Class Interests  
Threats to Achieving Socialist Common Prosperity 
The private sector in China has been growing since the 1978’s economic reform 
and accounted for about 60% of the national GDP by the end of 2017 (Meng, 2018). With 
the growth of the private sector, its more active political participation, and the current 
government policy of pushing marketization, the socialist vision of common prosperity 
could be seriously challenged. 
The 1978 economic reform, the consistent pushing of marketization, and the 
expansion of the private sector in China have given rise to a new capitalist class and 
working class (So, 2013). The capitalist class is much more powerful than the working 
classes and have continued to “work hard to try to influence the government to serve their 
class interests” (So, 2013, p. 67).  
The new capitalist class tends to be more powerful than the working class for at 
least four reasons. First, the new capitalist class in many cases is a fusion of the 
Communist Party cadres and entrepreneurs (So, 2013). David (2000, p. 15) reports that 
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“most entrepreneurs, including those in the private sector of the economy…either had 
social origins in the party-state or were for the most part incorporated into its activities”. 
“This hybrid cadre–capitalist class has monopolized political capital, economic capital, 
and social/network capital in Chinese society” (So, 2013, p.64). Chen (2002, p. 412) 
commented that, “A large portion, if not a majority, of the bourgeois have prospered from 
the commercial privileges deriving from political lineage”.  
Second, the new capitalist class is well organized and have established fully 
functioning class networks (So,2013). For example, the organizations include  
 
“All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, the China Enterprise 
Confederation, the China Enterprise Directors Association, the China Township 
and Village Enterprise Association, and the Chinese Foreign Sector Business 
Association. They have established extensive organizational networks extending 
from the national to provincial, city, and county levels” (So, 2013, p.65).  
 
However, the working class are less organized and their local organizing is not 
connected at city, provincial, or national level (Chan & Hui, 2017). 
Third, as argued by Forester (1988), capitalists are much more familiar with 
governmental affairs than working class people who don’t deal with government 
professionals often. Capitalists also have much more expertise and free time to participate 
in public policymaking because they can afford to hire professionals to work for them. 
On the contrary, working class people often lack such freedom and time to participate 
actively which makes potential misinformation and manipulation during policymaking 
process possible.  
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Fourth, recruitment of capitalists into the communist party in 2001 solidified the 
bond between the party cadres and the capitalists and gave more political power to the 
capitalist class. This provides more opportunities for capitalist class to manipulate policy 
making for their own interests. Heilmann and Melton (2013) supported this claim arguing 
that the Chinese planning system tends to create and sustain the vested interests. For 
example, in 2007, a new Property Law was passed by the National People’s Congress due 
to the consistent push by the capital class. The law legally protects private property the 
same as it protects public property.  
In sum, a new capitalist class has been formed and it keeps growing stronger. A 
large number of the capitalists either hold positions in the Party or have tight connections 
with the Party. Without the working class’s strong resistance, this cadre–capitalist class 
can easily manipulate public policy including five-year plans to serve their class interests 
at the expenses of the working class, peasants, or consumers. Thus, it is important to 
check the most recent five-year plan and explore how different social groups’ interests 
are reflected in the plans.  
 
A Marxist Analysis of Class Interests  
To evaluate how different classes’ interests are reflected in the Thirteenth Five-
Year Plans, I follow a Marxist class analysis approach as described by Wright (2005). 
Wright presented six major class analysis methodologies in sociology: Marxist class 
analysis, Weberian class analysis, Durkheimian class analysis, Bourdieu’s class analysis, 
Ricardian class analysis, and Post-Class analysis. Different approaches have different 
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theoretical assumptions and key research agendas. Marxist class analysis suits my 
research because of its central concern of exploitation. Wright (2005, p. 16) argued that  
 
“what makes class analysis distinctively Marxist is the account of specific 
mechanisms that are seen as generating these two kinds of consequences. Here the 
pivotal concept is exploitation. This is the conceptual element that anchors the 
Marxist concept of class in the distinctive Marxist agenda of class analysis”.  
 
The “two kinds of consequences” mentioned by Wright refer to the systematic 
and significant effects of class relation on both individuals’ lives and dynamics of social 
institutions (Wright, 2005). Wright (2005, p17) defined the concept of exploitation as 
such:  
 
“Exploitation is thus a diagnosis of the process through which the inequalities in 
incomes are generated by inequalities in rights and powers over productive 
resources: the inequalities occur, in part at least, through the ways in which 
exploiters, by virtue of their exclusionary rights and powers over resources, are 
able to appropriate surplus generated by the effort of the exploited”.  
 
Exploitation is closely related to another concept, domination. Wright argued 
(2005, p.18) that  
 
“Domination occurs, first, in the exclusion principle: “owning” a resource gives one 
power to prevent other people from using it. The power exercised by employers to 
hire and fire workers is the clearest example of this form of domination. But 
domination also occurs, in most instances, in conjunction with the appropriation 
principle, since the appropriation of the labor effort of the exploited usually requires 
direct forms of subordination, especially within the labor process, in the form of 
bossing, surveillance, threats, etc.” 
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The domination described above happens in the realm of production, or the labor 
process. However, as argued in the last section, considering that the capitalist class in 
China has been gaining more political influence at all levels of Chinese government, it is 
reasonable to assume that this domination could also happen in politics which to some 
extent feeds back to the labor process. The exclusion principle of domination is satisfied 
in the following. By serving as the Community Party members and public officials and 
maintaining a tight connection with public officials, the capitalists in China enjoy 
privileged political resources that are inaccessible to workers. For example, Chan and Hui 
(2017, p.235) recorded how the Chinese government responded to global capital’s 
pressure after the 2008 economic crisis by retreating from the labour regulations. The 
retreating legitimized global capital’s harsh appropriation. 
 
“The Guangdong provincial government froze the minimum wage rate, put off 
wage consultations in enterprises and reduced enterprises’ contributions to social 
insurance. The Shenzhen government removed the punitive clauses on wage 
arrears in the Regulations of the Shenzhen Municipality on the Wage Payment to 
Employees in October 2009 and altered the definition of wages and overtime 
work in ways that help reduce enterprises’ labour costs”. 
 
The pro-capital measures induced massive labor resistance (Chan & Hui, 2017). 
Due to the lack of access to political resources, such as mechanisms to participate in 
policy-making, and increasing exploitation ignored by the government, workers violently 
protested. And Chinese governments had to respond to the protests by changing some of 
the measures. Chan and Hui (2017, 235) argued that “this shows that the Chinese state 
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does not simply reflect the capitalist class’s interests. It is a field of class struggles and its 
policies are simultaneously shaped by capital and labor.” 
To evaluate class interests reflected in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans, I will first 
define class interests, then specify a two-location class model, and finally describe briefly 
how the evaluation process will proceed. Wright’s definition of class interest is adopted. 
Wright (2005, p.12) defined class interests as  
“the material interests of people derived from their location-within-class-relations. 
‘Material interests’ include a range of issue - standards of living, working 
conditions, level of toil, leisure, material security, and other things.” 
“When the rights and powers of people over productive resources are unequally 
distributed – when some people have greater rights/powers with respect to 
specific kinds of productive resources than do others – these relations can be 
described as class relations” (Wright, 2005, p.5). 
 
Thus, when I look for class interests in the five-year plans, standards of living, 
working conditions, level of toil, leisure, material security, and other things related to 
class locations will be identified and coded. Wright’s (2005, p.12) definition of class 
location is also adopted. 
 
“designate the social positions occupied by individuals within a particular kind of 
social relation, class relations, not simply an atomized attribute of the person…... 
A class location is not a class; it is a location-within-relations. The number of 
such locations within an analysis of class structure, then, depends upon how fine-
grained an account is needed for the purposes at hand……. For other problems, a 
more coarse-grained description of locations-within-relations may provide more 
insight. In my work on the problem of class compromise I felt a much simpler two-
location class model consisting only of workers and capitalists was appropriate” 
(Wright, 2005, p.9). 
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I argue that a two-location class model is appropriate for my research. The reason 
to include a class analysis is to help understand the issue of imbalance as defined before. 
Two main aspects of the imbalance are the income and wealth gap between the rich and 
the poor, and the income and wealth gap between the rural and urban residents. A 
primary source of the gaps comes from the inequality between the wealthy capitalists and 
the poor rural workers who either work as farmers or migrant workers. An analysis of 
capital and labor interests is sufficient to show how the two classes benefit differently 
from the plans and will contribute to the understanding of the imbalance. In 2018, more 
than 53% of total work force in China worked in the primary industry (agriculture) and 
the secondary industry (mining, manufacturing, construction, etc.) (CSY, 2019). 
Compared with the low-skilled workers who work in the primary and secondary industry, 
the proportion of high-skilled labor, experts, and managers in China is relatively small. 
Thus, a two-location class model, the capital-labor division, is appropriate for my 
research.   
The goals and strategies in the selected five-year plans will be evaluated 
systematically in terms of their potential beneficiaries. According to the description of the 
texts in the plans, two independent and well-trained coders coded which group is direct 
beneficiary of the strategy. More detailed evaluation procedures will be described in the 










Multiple Case Study Research Design 
This is an instrumental and multiple case study that aims to explore the issue of 
imbalanced development in China through describing and analyzing China’s Thirteenth 
Five-Year Plans. There are several reasons why case study is the most appropriate 
approach for my research.  
First, the epistemology of the critical social research underpins my research 
design. The principal concern of critical social research is not to discover the causes of 
the observed social phenomena. This makes research designs that are intended to look for 
phenomenon’s causes such as experimental and quasi-experimental design not 
appropriate. The critical social research is not interested in the relationships between 
aggregated variables if they don’t help the process of criticizing. This rules out typical 
correlational research designs. The critical social research goes beyond describing social 
phenomena and interpreting people’s lived experiences and their constructed meanings. 
This rules out research designs such as phenomenological research.  
As argued by Lee Harvey (1990, p.7), “critical social research thus aims at an 
analysis of social processes, delving beneath ostensive and dominant conceptual frames, 
in order to reveal the underlying practices, their historical specificity and structural 
manifestations”.  I want to explore whether and how the issue of imbalanced 
development is addressed in the Thirteenth FYPs, whether the government is fulfilling 
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the promise of common prosperity, and whether there are exploitive arrangements 
embedded in the plans. To answer these questions, I need deep understanding of the 
Thirteenth FYPs as they were produced by the Chinese government. Crowe et al. (2011, 
p. 1) argued that   
 
“A case study is a research approach that is used to generate an in-depth, multi-
faceted understanding of a complex issue in its real-life context…… (And it) is 
particularly useful to employ when there is a need to obtain an in-depth appreciation 
of an issue, event or phenomenon of interest, in its natural real-life context”. 
 
Even though case study can be approached in different ways, the “central tenet 
being the need to explore an event or phenomenon in depth and in its natural context” 
(Crowe et al., 2011, p.1). Yin (2009, p. 18) defined case study as “an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context.” 
Stake (1995) summarized three types of case study, intrinsic, instrumental, and collective. 
Intrinsic case study is to learn about a particular phenomenon. Instrumental case study is 
conducted to explore a particular issue and a collective case study investigates multiple 
cases at the same time to gain a broader understanding of the phenomenon. Considering 
the central tenet of case study approach and my need to deeply investigate the FYPs in a 
naturalistic setting, case study approach is most appropriate research design for me.  
Second, I have clearly identifiable cases with boundaries. The boundaries are 
China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plans. Creswell and Poth (2016, p. 151) defined case study 
as a research approach “in which the investigator explores a real-life, contemporary 
bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time……and reports a 
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case description and case themes”. The Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (2016-2020) consist 
of real-life, contemporary multiple bounded plan documents as cases. The most important 
reason why I chose to use official planning documents as cases is that I am interested in a 
phenomenon that happened in the past. The plans were produced during the time from 
2011 to 2016. Four years have passed since they were made laws. In this sense, the 
research is historical. I cannot can observe the planning process. Even if there are videos 
or reports of the planning process, they won’t be as complete, consistent, and rigorous as 
the official plans. Analyzing well written and circulated official plans provides accurate 
and deep insights about what were included in the plans, and lays the foundation for 
making logical inferences and arguments. The evaluation results will serve to better 
future policy making.  
Third, the research is intended to provide an in-depth understanding of the 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plans as cases to shine light on the issue of imbalanced 
development in China. Creswell and Poth (2017, p.153) argued that  
 
“A qualitative case study can be composed to illustrate a unique 
case……Alternatively, the intent of the case study may be to understand a 
specific issue, problem, or concern and a case or cases selected to best understand 
the problem. This is called an instrumental case”.  
 
My study is instrumental in the sense that I aim to contribute to the understanding 
of imbalanced development in China by analyzing multiple five-year plans.  
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Case Selection/ Purposeful Sampling 
Study Population: All of China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plans (2016-2020) at 
national, provincial, and city levels (N>330). I will focus on published online official 
planning papers named Thirteenth Socio-Economic Five-Year Plans.  
Sample design: The maximum variation sampling strategy was adopted (Patton, 
2002). Provinces selected vary to a great extent in terms of their socio-economic 
indicators such as GDP, GDP per capita, and the percentage of workforce employed by 
the private industrial sector. Provincial plans were selected from the three different 
regions, the eastern, western, and central region. Province GDP in 2014 was selected as 
an indicator of variation because the main concern of the imbalanced development is 
economic. The percentage of workforce employed by the private industrial sector 
indicates the strength of the private industrial sector in the province. It’s important 
because one of the research questions deal with the political participation of the capitalist 
class. The same sampling strategy applied when the cities were selected in each province.  
Sample size:  With the maximum variation strategy, I purposefully selected 2 
provinces from each region and 2 cities from each selected province and then analyzed 
their official planning papers. In total, 20 official planning papers were analyzed, 2 
National Five-Year Plans including the Twelfth and Thirteenth Plan, 6 provincial Five-
Year Plans, and 12 city Five-Year Plans. 
The sampling of the eastern region: there are 11 provinces in the eastern region 
(CSY, 2020). Jiangsu and Hebei Province were selected, according to the maximum 
variation criterion. Jiangsu Province was ranked as top across all kinds of economic 
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indicators in 2014 when the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans were made. For example, it had 
the second highest Provincial GDP in the Eastern region; highest sum of paid-in capital 
of the private industrial enterprises; highest number of higher education institutions 
(Yearbook, 2020). Hebei Province had the lowest percentage of people employed in the 
private sector, second lowest GDP per capita in 2014, and third lowest percentage of 
GDP contributed by the private industrial sector in the region. In Jiangsu Province, the 
city of Changzhou and Lianyungang were selected. Changzhou had the highest percent of 
employment by the private sector and Changzhou had the lowest (Jiangsu Bureau of 
Statistics, 2020) in 2014. In Hebei Province, the city of Tangshan and Hengshui were 
selected. Tangshan had the highest percent of employment by the private sector and 
Hengshui had the lowest (Hebei Bureau of Statistics, 2020). 
The sampling of the Central region: there are 8 provinces in the Eastern region. 2 
Provinces were selected, according to the maximum variation criterion. Jiangxi Province 
performed average in terms of GDP, GDP per capita, but had highest percentage of GDP 
contributed by the private industrial sector. Heilongjiang Province had the second lowest 
percentage of employment in the private sector and the lowest percentage of GDP 
contributed by the private industrial sector. In Jiangxi Province, the city of Jiujiang and 
Nanchang were selected. Jiujiang had the highest percent of employment by the private 
sector and Nanchang had the lowest (Jiangxi Bureau of Statistics, 2020). In Heilongjiang 
Province, the city of Tangshan and Hengshui were selected. Shuangyashan had the 
highest percent of employment by the private sector and Yichun had the lowest 
(Heilongjiang Bureau of Statistics, 2020).  
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The sampling of the Western region: there are 12 provinces in the Eastern region. 
2 Provinces were selected, according to the maximum variation criterion. Neimenggu 
Province had the highest GDP per capita, second highest employment percentage in the 
private sector, and the second highest percentage of GDP contributed by the private 
industrial sector in 2014 in the Western region. Yunnan Province had the third lowest 
GDP per capita, third lowest percentage of GDP contributed by the private industrial 
sector, and about average employment percentage in the private sector. In Neimenggu 
Province, the city of Bayannaoer and Tongliao were selected. Bayannaoer had the highest 
percent of employment by the private sector and Hengshui had the lowest (Neimenggu 
Bureau of Statistics, 2020). In Yunnan Province, the city of Yuxi and Zhaotong were 
selected. Yuxi had the highest percent of employment by the private sector and Zhaotong 
had the lowest (Yunnan Bureau of Statistics, 2020). 
 
Data Collection Method 
My data collection method is downloading secondary data, the official planning 
papers published by the Chinese government. The most important reason why I choose to 
download the official planning papers is that I am interested in studying plans that were 
made in the past. The plans were produced from 2013 to 2016. Four years have passed 
since they were made laws. In this sense, the research is historical. Analyzing well 
written and circulated official plans provides accurate and deep insights about what were 
included in the plans, and lays the foundation for making logical inferences and 
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arguments. The inferences and arguments will serve as a critical examination and 
reflection of past policies and will serve to better future policy making.  
For trade-off between breadth and depth, I choose breadth because I want to have 
a multiple case comparison and get a more generalized conclusion about China’s 
thirteenth five-year plans. Interviewing people and analyzing transcripts can be very time 
consuming and with limited research time, I prefer to do more plan analysis to increase 
the validity of my research conclusion in Chinese context. 
 
Data Analysis Method 
The five-year plans were analyzed by the method of summative content analysis  
(Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  Hsieh and Shannon (2005, p.1283-1284) argued that 
 
 “a summative approach to qualitative content analysis goes beyond mere word 
counts to include latent content analysis. Latent content analysis refers to the 
process of interpretation of content. In this analysis, the focus is on discovering 
underlying meanings of the words or the content”.  
 
This approach suits my research because the answers to my research questions 
require more than word counts. It requires making sense of the underlying content such 
as the spatial and social implications of the five-year plans.  
The most important reason why I choose to use content analysis is that the 
answers to my research question are not directly observable. It only comes to light by 
researchers’ reading, analyzing, interpreting, and concluding. In this case, the five-year 
plans were made in the past and it’s impossible to observe the plan making process. Also, 
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if one of the social groups such as the capitalist class tends to benefit more from the five-
year plans, this arrangement could be deliberately hidden in some way and made hard for 
people to discern. At last, the social implications of the research questions are politically 
sensitive. Some interviewers might have a stake in the plans and might not be willing to 
answer questions honestly.  
 
Data Analysis Procedures 
The data analysis follows the content analysis procedure described by Zhang and 
Wildemuth (2016). 
Step 1: Data Preparing: 
The official five-year plans were downloaded. 
Step 2: Define the Unit of Analysis: 
The research includes multiple levels of unit of analysis: China overall as a 
country, regional level, provincial level, and city level.  
Step 3: Develop Categories and a Coding Scheme: 
The key words for coding are the urban, the rural, the eastern, the central, the 
western, the rich, the poor, inequality, poverty, anti-poverty, farmers, workers, high 
skilled professionals, industries, micro, small and mid-size business/enterprise, and 
entrepreneurs. The Chinese words in the plans that have the liberal meanings of the key 
words above were highlighted as key words.  
The key words were generated from a review of the literature review. As 
presented in the first section of the literature review, imbalanced development in China is 
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defined as the spatial inequality between the urban and the rural regions, and between 
eastern, and western and central regions; and the social inequality of income and wealth 
between the rich and the poor. Building on Marx’s class theory, the rich are represented 
by the class of capitalist and the poor are represented by the working class (Wright, 
2005).  
Coding scheme is defined as such: 
The first thing coded was whether the strategy proposed in the plan addresses the 
issue of imbalance. As defined earlier, there are three main aspects of imbalanced 
development, the economic disparity between the urban and rural regions, between 
eastern, and western and central regions, and between the rich’s and the poor’s income 
and accumulated wealth. If the strategy directly deals with the gap, or it aims to improve 
the situation of the rural area, the Western and the Central regions, or it supports the poor 
who could be farmers or workers, then the strategy will be coded as “Y” which means it 
addresses the issue of imbalance. However, if there are no key words related to the urban, 
rural, Western, Central, workers, farmers, the poor, and the low-income or the words that 
have similar meaning are found in the strategy, then the strategy will be coded as “N” 
which means it does not address the issue of imbalance. 
The key words were used to identify strategies related to the different regions and 
social groups in the five-year plans. In order to understand how different regions and 
social groups’ interests are reflected in the plans, planning strategies' potential direct 
beneficiaries were coded and put in matrices for later analysis. If no key words related to 
regions, urban and rural areas and social groups are identified in the texts, and the 
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strategy is irrelevant to imbalanced development or its implication for imbalanced 
development cannot be logically reached unless extra information or specific context is 
provided, then the strategy was coded as NA. The strategy’s implication was coded as 
NA if the strategy benefits more than one group or one region.  
The strategies that have clear spatial implications were coded as either “the 
Eastern region, represented by E”, or “the Central Region, represented by C”, or “the 
Western Region, represented by W”; or “the Urban area, represented by U”, or “the Rural 
area, represented by R”, or “the general public by G”. For Marx class analysis, the 
strategy will be coded as either “the capitalists, represented by Cap”, or “the working 
class, represented by Wor, or “the general public by G”. “G” means the strategy’s goal is 
broad and general and no specific group or region is mentioned and emphasized. If there 
are no key words related to class or regional interests, it was coded as NA.  If a strategy 
benefits both workers and capitalists, and key words related to class interests are 
identified, then the strategy were coded as G. If a strategy benefits both the urban and 
rural areas, and key words related to the spatial interests are identified, then the strategy 
was coded as G. If a strategy benefits both the Eastern and Western, or Eastern and 
Central, and key words related to regional interests are identified, then the strategy was 
coded as G. 
The operational definition of direct beneficiary is defined as such: 
Direct beneficiary is the region or group that, according to the plan’s goals or 
strategies texts, will directly receive supports as written. The words “support” or the 
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words with similar meanings have to be found in the texts. The name of the group has to 
be clearly shown in the texts such as XXX industry or farmers.   
 Every plan was coded as presented in the table below: 
 
Table 3.1 Coding Matrices 
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Step 4: Code All the Text 
Step 5: Assess Coding Consistency 
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Step 7: Draw Conclusions from the Coded Data 
Step 8: Report Analytic Methods and Findings (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2009, p. 2-
5)  
 
Trustworthiness of the Research 
Different Research Paradigms and Different Criteria to Judge Research Quality  
Qualitative content analysis as a data analysis methodology, is essentially 
different from the Positivist methodologies such as statistical modeling and experimental 
analysis in terms of its research paradigm, purpose, and inference process. The 
conventional criteria such as internal and external validity, reliability, and objectivity are 
not suitable to evaluate the quality of qualitative content analysis (Zhang & Wildemuth, 
2009). The qualitative content analysis method adopted in my research follows the 
critical research paradigm described by Fay (1987). 
This critical social science research paradigm is different from the Positivist 
research paradigm in that it does not solely seek to theorize and discover universally 
applicable and objective laws of human society. It’s not interested in abstract laws that 
transcend time and space unless the knowledge helps the oppressed. Critical social 
science is also different from the Constructivism in the sense that it does not limit 
research scope at purely describing subjects’ self-constructions or constructed meanings. 
By presenting evidence and making arguments in particular contexts, it goes further to 
challenge research audiences’ existing knowledge, beliefs, and false consciousness and 
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help them see themselves or certain social phenomenon differently and stimulate changes 
(Fay, 1987). 
The qualitative content analysis adopted in my research is interpretive and relies 
on researchers’ subjective judgements to perform the inference process, the Step 5. Thus, 
the criteria used to judge research that seeks objectivity cannot be applied. Elo et al. 
(2014, p. 2) argued that “the most widely used criteria for evaluating qualitative content 
analysis are those developed by (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). They used the term 
trustworthiness”. The four criteria proposed to establish trustworthiness are credibility, 
confirmability, dependability, and transferability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The figure 
below summaries the four criteria.  
 
Figure 3.1 Four Criteria to Evaluate Trustworthiness 
 




In the following section, I will first introduce the concept of trustworthiness and 
then explain how I have established trustworthiness in my research by satisfying the four 
criteria.  
Trustworthiness 
 Gill et al. (2018, p. 194) argued that 
 
“Trustworthiness equates to an inquirer making their research practices visible, 
and therefore auditable, enabling others to gain a richer insight into how their 
findings were produced. ‘Trustworthiness’, instead of ‘truth’, reflects the 
idea that validation is displaced ‘from its traditional location in a presumably 
objective, nonreactive, and neutral reality, and moves it to the social world – a 
world constructed in and through our discourse and actions, through.” 
 
The key point is that establishing trustworthiness is to make the research credible 
for whoever intends to read and understand the research. High trustworthiness means 
research audiences find both research process and results highly credible and can be 
trusted.  
Satisfying the Four Criteria  
(1) Credibility: Lincoln and Guba argued that (1985, p. 213) “a major 
trustworthiness criterion is ‘credibility in the eyes of the information sources, for without 
such credibility the findings and conclusions as a whole cannot be found credible by the 
consumer of the inquiry report”. Gill et al. (2018, p.195) suggested that the criterion is 
satisfied when research audiences or readers “agree with or have confidence in the 
researchers’ interpretations or reconstructions”. Lincoln and Guba (1987) proposed two 
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principles of credibility: engage with the content and context of sources; and discuss 
interpretations. 
My research was designed to satisfy the two principles. First, engaging with the 
content and context of sources means being familiar with the research subjects and the 
contexts the subjects are in by sustained engagement. After two years of consistent study 
of urban planning and research design in the Ph.D. program, including planning theories 
and practices, urban economics, and planning evaluation, I am familiar with the subject 
of plan evaluation. To better understand Chinese planning context, I devoted a large 
portion of my literature review for Chinese planning history and particularly its five-year 
planning history. By providing the history and evaluating past five-year plan research, my 
research design shows the familiarity with the research subject. Second, Lincoln and 
Guba (1987) argued that peer debriefing should be deployed to discuss researchers’ 
interpretations.  Gill et all. (2018, p.196) maintained that “peer debriefing describes an 
inquirer exposing their work to a disinterested peer to keep the inquirer ‘honest’, to test 
emerging hypotheses and identify assumptions or feelings that may cloud good 
judgment”. On the one hand, my four Ph.D. committee members are all experienced 
researchers in the field of planning and my work will be examined and discussed by 
them. On the other hand, an inter-coder reliability score was computed to strengthen my 
research credibility. Usually, a score is considered acceptable when it is equal or greater 
than 80%  
(2) Confirmability 
 55 
Gill et all. (2018, p.196) argued that “confirmability refers to researchers’ 
attempts to identify some of their assumptions and predilections in the findings of their 
study through explicit consideration of their interpretation of the data”. Lincoln and Guba 
(1987) proposed two principles of confirmability: revealing underlying assumptions; and 
ensure interpretations are grounded in evidence.  
First, this research’s fundamental assumption is that the official evaluations and 
claims about of China’s Five-Year Plans could be unreliable because of the potential 
influence of the capitalist class. Even though a Marxist approach of class analysis was 
adopted in my research, I am not a Marxist. I do find the class analysis useful in 
identifying potential oppressive arrangements in the plans. But there are many areas that I 
don’t agree with the mainstream Marxists such as Cohen. For example, I don’t believe 
capitalism is doomed to self-destruction and socialism is inevitable. I do see some merits 
of private production but I don’t believe it should be the only way of human production.  
Second, to ensure my interpretations are grounded in evidence, I made sure my 
coding schemes and procedures are transparent and well displayed. The reasons for each 
judgment made in the coding process was fully presented in the coding matrix. The 
inference process relied on well-accepted socio-economic theories and logic. Thus, other 
researchers are able to see the coding process and reflect on and criticize my research. 
(3) Dependability 
Gill et all. (2018, p.198) argued that dependability “called for interpretivist 
researchers to explain that their approach and process of developing interpretations is 
dependable, as they are only likely to yield credible results if they exhibit consistency”. 
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Lincoln and Guba (1987) proposed two principles of dependability: adopt different 
approaches to research; allow others to comment on the process of research.  
First, a key technique to satisfy the principle of adopting different approaches to 
research is triangulation (Lincoln and Guba, 1987). Gill et all. (2018, p.198) added that 
“this principle encourages researchers to use not only different sources, but also different 
methods and researchers to gather and interpret data”. Part of my evaluation results were 
triangulated with a labor strike dataset and the conclusion generated was consistent with 
existing economic theories.  
Second, my committee members especially my chair who is also my academic 
advisor had kept commented on my research process. They have expertise in the field and 
research experiences to guide my research.  
(4) Transferability 
Gill et all. (2018, p.199) argued that  
 
“Scholars seeking to meet the criterion of transferability must be able to provide 
sufficient detail to contextualize their interpretations of a historical event, or what 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) refer to as a database, to facilitate future judgments 
about the transferability of findings to other contexts”.  
 
Lincoln and Guba (1987) proposed two principles of transferability : Build a 
richly contextualized account of the cases under study; Permit comparison of context 
under study to other contexts. 
First, my review of Chinese planning history and Chinese scholars’ research of 
the five-year plans provided rich contexts of my research case, five-year plans. In 
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addition to the literature reviewed, the key aspects of the plans were summarized to give 
more information of the plans’ contexts.  
Second, my research data, the plans are openly published and accessible to all. 
This openness and accessibility of my data provides great opportunity for other 
researchers to gain deep understanding of my cases and their contexts. Interested 
researchers can compare both my plans’ qualities and plans’ contexts to their research. 
Not only my data and their contexts could be useful for future researchers, my 























Inter-Coder Reliability Score 
As mentioned earlier, an inter-coder reliability score is generally considered 
acceptable when it is equal or greater than 80% (Miles & Huberman, 1994). After 
comparing my codes of the National Thirteenth Five-Year Plan with the ones produced 
by the other coder, the computed score is 87.2%.  
After being familiar with the coding rules and framework, the other coder worked 
independently and produced the codes. He is a Ph.D. student studying political science in 
Japan and focuses on e-governance. He is familiar with public policy and fluent both in 
Chinese and English.  
The limitation of the score is that there is only one five-year plan that was co-
coded by both of us. There are 243 strategies in the five-year plan and our codes differ 
only in 31 strategies which is 87.2% agreement. However, we reached our consensus 
after we worked out our mayor coding differences. The major disagreement in the 
beginning of the discussion was that we had a different understanding about the word 
“enterprises”. In the National Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, the word “enterprises” was 
widely used and was an important signal word for coders to identify the capitalist class in 
the plan. In China, there are both private and public enterprises. When the word appears 
in the plan text, it’s not straightforward that whether it refers to both of them or just the 
private enterprises. I coded it as referring to the private enterprises unless there are words 
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indicating the other way. He coded it for the most part as referring to both of them. We 
had a discussion and he agreed with me after I listed my three reasons. First, when public 
enterprises are mentioned in the five-year plans, the phrases used are “state-owned 
enterprises”. The word “state-owned” is always attached to the word “enterprises” and 
there are several goals and strategies specifically devoted to the state-owned enterprises. 
Second, the private enterprises are playing a more and more important role in China 
especially in new strategic industries such internet, and big data industry. The plan 
emphasized innovation and job creation which for the most part now come from the 
private enterprises. Thus, when enterprises are mentioned in the plan text, unless there are 
words that signal the other meaning, treating “enterprises” as the private ones is not 
unreasonable. At last, the word “enterprises” was not treated blindly as private 
enterprises. Constant attempts were made to determine the exact meanings of the word in 
the specific plan text.  
 
The Issue of Imbalanced Development  
National Plans  
Yes, following the trend of the Eleventh and Twelfth Five-Year Plan, the issue of 
imbalanced development in China, is addressed in all Thirteenth Five-Year plans 
analyzed. Imbalanced development as defined in the earlier section, refers to spatial 
inequality, and income and wealth inequality (Xi, 2017). Spatial inequality refers to the 
huge economic disparity between the urban and rural regions, and between the eastern, 
western, and central regions. Income and wealth inequality refers to the huge gap in 
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income and accumulated wealth between the rich and the poor, as measured by the Gini 
coefficient.  
In the Twelfth National Five-Year plan, 53 out of 168 (31.5%) strategies address 
imbalance while in the Thirteenth National Five-Year plan, only 50 out of 193 (20.6%) 
deal with the issue. The remaining strategies in the plans do not directly address any 
aspect of imbalanced development. Rather they cover broad topics such as demographic 
work, public safety, socialism values, environment protection, and climate change. 
 
Table 4.1 The Issue of Imbalance at the National Level 
 

































The goals and strategies that address imbalance are mostly shared by the Twelfth 
and Thirteenth National Five-Year Plan, despite the Twelfth plan’s higher percentage of 
31.5%, compared with the Thirteenth’s 20.6%. The shared goals that address the issue in 
both plans include agriculture development, rural development, regional development 
strategies, income distribution and redistribution, public service improvement such as 
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education and healthcare service, social security programs, and public tax and finance 
reform. 
The main difference between the two plans, in terms of addressing imbalance, is 
that farmers and the rural areas are emphasized more in the Twelfth plan where the first 4 
goals and 14 strategies are all devoted to their concerns. These strategies are specifically 
designed to support the farmers and rural areas. However, in the Thirteenth plan, 
attention to their issues is switched to a more general concern of poverty and innovation. 
There are a few goals and strategies for the farmers and rural areas in the Thirteenth 
national plan. However, in all Thirteenth five-year plans the goal of “Poverty Reduction 
and Elimination” serves as an umbrella goal to organize different strategies to fight 
against poverty. The word “poverty” is used in a general way to include poor people and 
poor places, both the urban and rural poor. There is no such umbrella goal in the Twelfth 
plan. The efforts to reduce and eliminate poverty is more organized and systematic in the 
Thirteenth plan. Thus, it’s hard to judge which of the two national plans emphasizes the 
issue of imbalanced development more. Different aspects of the issue are emphasized in 
the two plans. The drop in the percentage of strategies that deal with imbalance can be 
interpreted as an alarming signal warning people to keep their eyes open for future 
policies that might ignore or downplay the issue of imbalance.  
Provincial Plans 
In the 6 provincial plans, 143 strategies (17.6%) out of 811 address the issue of 
imbalanced development.  
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Table 4.2 The Issue of Imbalance at the Provincial Level 
 




















































All 6 provincial plans have relatively fewer strategies that address imbalance than 
in the two national plans, with highest percentage of 19.5% in Jiangxi Province and the 
lowest 15.6% in Neimenggu Province. A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed 
to compare whether the percentage distributions are homogenous or not between national 
and province level by RStudio (version, 1.2.5033).  
A chi-square test, with p-value 0.002216 rejects the null of hypothesis of identical 
distribution across national and provincial plans. It supports the claim that the 
distributions of the number of the strategies that address and don’t address the issue in the 
national and provincial plans are significantly different.2 A proportion test, with p-value 
 
2 A proportion test was performed to determine whether national plans’ Y percentage (the percentage of the 
strategies that address the issue) is higher than province plans’ Y percentage or not. The result generated by 
RStudio shows that p value equals 0.001422 which is less than 0.05. It rejects the null hypothesis that 
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0.001422 rejects the null hypothesis that national plans’ Y percentage is equal to 
provincial plans’ Y percentage. Thus, it supports the claim that national plans’ Y 
percentage is higher than provincial plans’ Y percentage.  
The provincial plans for the most part follow Thirteenth national plan’s goals and 
strategies except the part of three-region (Eastern, Central, and Western) development 
goal which is beyond province level. For example, all of the province plans have 
independent and umbrella goals of “poverty reduction and elimination”. The leading and 
central role of innovation in the economy is upheld. The strategies that address the issue 
are very similar as the ones in the national plan. They include agriculture development, 
coordinated and unified rural and urban development, targeted poverty reduction and 
elimination, income distribution and redistribution, and better public services.  
Thus, with similar plan structures and strategies, and lower Y percentage, it can 
be argued that the issue of imbalanced development is given more attention and emphasis 
in the national plans than the provincial plans.  
City Plans 
In in the 12 city plans, 159 strategies (15.9%) among 1001 strategies address the 
issue of imbalanced development.  
 
Table 4.3 The Issue of Imbalance at the City Level 
 
City Name Province Total Y N 
 
national plans’ Y percentage is equal to province plans’ Y percentage. Thus, it supports the claim that 


















































































All 12 city plans except Zhaotong City’s plan, have relatively fewer strategies that 
address imbalance than in the two national plans, with the second highest percentage of 
19.1% in Tongliao City and the lowest 14.6% in Yuxi City. City plans’ overall 15.9% is 
also lower than provincial plans’ 17.6%.3  
 
3 Chi-Square tests of homogeneity were performed to compare whether the percentage distributions are 
homogenous or not between the national and city level, and between the province and city level by RStudio 
(version, 1.2.5033). The contingency tables used are listed below.  
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A chi-square test, with p-value 0.00005591 rejects the null of hypothesis of 
identical distribution across national and city plans. 4 
A chi-square test, with p-value 0.3207 fails to reject the null of hypothesis of 
identical distribution across provincial and city plans.5 
The city plans also follow national plan’s structure. For example, all city plans 
have the independent and umbrella goal of “poverty reduction and elimination”. The 
leading and central role of innovation in the economy is emphasized too. The strategies 
that address imbalance are almost the same as the ones in the national plans. They 
propose agriculture development, unified rural and urban development, farmers’ 
urbanization and citizenization, income distribution and redistribution to increase mid-
income groups, targeted poverty reduction and elimination, and better public services 
such as improved education and healthcare service.  
Thus, with similar plan structures and strategies, and lower Y percentage, it can 
be argued that the issue of imbalanced development is given more attention and emphasis 
in the national plans than both the provincial and city plans. With similar plan structures 
and strategies, and Y percentage, it can be argued that the issue of imbalanced 
development is given similar attention and emphasis in the provincial plans and city 
 
4 It supports the claim that the distributions of the number of the strategies that address and don’t address 
the issue in the national and city plans are significantly different. A proportion test was performed to 
determine whether national plans’ Y percentage (the percentage of the strategies that address the issue) is 
higher than city plans’ Y percentage or not. The p value equals 0.00003842 which is less than 0.05. It 
rejects the null hypothesis that national plans’ Y percentage is equal to city plans’ Y percentage. Thus, it 
supports the claim that national plans’ Y percentage, combining the Twelfth and Thirteenth national plan, is 
higher than city plans’ Y percentage. 
5 It supports the claim that the distributions of the number of the strategies that address and don’t address 
imbalance in the provincial and city plans are homogenous. 
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plans. Since the issue of imbalance is less emphasized in the provincial and city plans, the 
disadvantaged groups and places should be more active at local level to participate in 
planning making and double-check plan implementation. 
 
The Strategies in the Five-Year Plans and Imbalanced Development 
National Plans  
In the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, 47 (28%) strategies among 168 strategies, tend to 
reduce imbalance while 39 (23.2%) strategies tend to reinforce imbalance. 82 (48.8%) 
strategies are not relevant to, or don’t not have clear implications for, the issue of 
imbalanced development. A strategy is considered to reduce imbalance when it benefits 
either the western region, or the central region, or the farmers, or workers, or the poor, or 
the rural areas; it reinforces imbalance when it benefits either the easter region, the 
capitalists, the rich, or the urban areas.  
Among 243 strategies proposed in the Thirteenth National Five-Year Plan, 51 
(21.0%) strategies tend to reduce imbalanced development while 57 (23.5%) strategies 
tend to reinforce it. 135 (55.6%) strategies are not relevant to, or don’t not have clear 
implications for, the issue of imbalanced development.  
 



















































In consistent with the conclusion that the Twelfth national plan have relatively 
more strategies that address imbalance than in the Thirteenth national plan, there are 
relatively more strategies that tend to reduce imbalance in the Twelfth plan than in the 
Thirteenth plan with 28.0% in the Twelfth plan and 21.0% in the Thirteenth plan. The 
goals and strategies that tend to reduce imbalance are almost the same ones that directly 
address the issue as summarized in the last section. 6  
The percentages of the strategies that tend to reduce and reinforce imbalanced 
development are similar in the Twelfth plan and Thirteenth national plan. The 
percentages are all around 20%. Thus, it can be argued that different goals and strategies 
that have different implications for the issue of imbalance are both well represented in the 
two plans. There are no one type of goals and strategies that dominate the national plans. 
 
6 For example, in the Twelfth plan, Y’s percentage is 31.5% and here Red’s percentage is 28.0%. They are 
very similar because most strategies that deal with the issue of imbalance tend to reduce it. Only in a few 
occasions, the strategies that address the issue of imbalance have multiple implications which makes it to 
be coded as “no clear implications, NA”. In the Thirteenth plan, Y’s percentage is 20.6% and here 21.0%. 
They incorporate goals such as agriculture development, unified rural and urban development, and better 
public services. The goals that tend to reinforce the imbalance are mostly shared by both plans and their 
percentages are almost the same which are about 23%. They focus on private industrial development, 
foreign commerce and trade, business recruitment, Eastern regional development and urban development 
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Provincial Plans 
In the provincial plans, 152 (18.7%) strategies among 811 strategies, tend to 
reduce imbalance while 176 (21.7%) strategies tend to reinforce imbalance.  
 
 Table 4.5 The Strategies and Imbalance at the Provincial Level 
 
Province 
Name Region Total Red Rei NA 



















































In the provincial plans, Red’s (the strategies that tend to reduce the imbalance) 
18.7% is close to Rei’s (the strategies that tend to reinforce the imbalance) 21.7%. The 
3% difference is not significant. It can be argued that different goals and strategies that 
have different implications for imbalance are both well represented in the provincial 
plans. There is no one type of goals and strategies that dominate the province plans. The 
goals and strategies that tend to reduce imbalance are almost the same ones that directly 
address the issue as summarized earlier. The goals that tend to reinforce the imbalance 
 69 
are mostly shared by all provinces. They focus on private sector industrial innovation and 
development, regional innovation, entrepreneurship, private sector development, urban 
development, and international commerce. A chi-square test, with p-value 0.05025 fails 
to reject the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across national and city plans.7    
City Plans 
In the city plans, 159 (15.9%) strategies among 1001 strategies tend to reduce 
imbalance and 194 (19.4%) strategies tend to reinforce it.  
 
Table 4.6 The Strategies and Imbalance at the City Level 
 
City Name Province Total Red Rei NA 
Changzhou  Jiangsu 131 18 29 84 
      13.7% 22.1% 64.1% 
Lianyungang  Jiangsu 111 19 27 65 
      17.1% 24.3% 58.6% 
Tangshan  Hebei  109 15 30 64 
      13.8% 27.5% 58.7% 
Hengshui  Hebei  93 16 24 53 
      17.2% 25.8% 57.0% 
Jiujiang  Jiangxi  118 20 17 81 
      16.9% 14.4% 68.6% 
Nanchang Jiangxi  41 5 9 27 
      12.2% 22.0% 65.9% 
Shuangyashan  Heilongjiang  21 4 1 14 
      19.0% 4.8% 66.7% 
Yichun  Heilongjiang  93 9 22 62 
      9.7% 23.7% 66.7% 
Bayannaoer  Neimenggu  71 11 13 47 
 
7 A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategy implication 
distributions are identical or not across national and provincial level with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The 
contingency table used is listed above. The test result shows that the p-value is bigger than 0.05. It fails to 
reject the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across national and provincial level. It supports the 
claim that the strategy implication distributions are homogenous across national and provincial plans. 
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      15.5% 18.3% 66.2% 
Tongliao  Neimenggu  110 20 9 81 
      18.2% 8.2% 73.6% 
Yuxi  Yunnan  41 6 5 30 
      14.6% 12.2% 73.2% 
Zhaotong 
shao  Yunnan 
62 16 8 38 
      25.8% 12.9% 61.3% 
Total   1001 159 194 646 
      15.9% 19.4% 64.5% 
 
 
In the city plans, Red’s 15.9% is close to Rei’s 19.4%. It can be argued that 
different goals and strategies that have different implications for the issue of imbalance 
are all well represented well in the city plans. No one type of goals or strategies that 
dominate the plans. The goals and strategies that tend to reduce imbalance are the same 
ones that directly address imbalance as summarized earlier. The goals that tend to 
reinforce imbalance are mostly shared by all cities. They focus on urban spatial layout, 
urbanization, special zones for development and innovation, internationalization of the 
city economy, entrepreneurship, foreign trade, and business recruitment. 
A chi-square test, with p-value 0.0006324 rejects the null of hypothesis of 
identical distribution across the national, provincial, and city plans. 8 
 
8 A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategy implication 
distributions are identical or not across national, provincial, and city plans with RStudio (version, 
1.2.5033). The contingency table used is listed above. The test result shows that the p-value is less than 
0.05. It rejects the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across national, provincial, and city plans. It 
supports the claim that the strategy implication distributions are significantly different across national, 
provincial, and city plans. 
 71 
In conclusion, first, the national five-year plans combining the Twelfth and 
Thirteenth national plan, have the highest proportion of the strategies that tend to reduce 
imbalance. It’s higher than the provincial and city plans’ proportions. And the provincial 
plans and city plans don’t differ in terms of their proportion of the strategies that tend to 
reduce imbalance. Second, the three levels of five-year plans don’t differ significantly in 
terms of their proportion of the strategies that tend to reinforce imbalance. 9   
 
Regional Imbalance and the National Five-Year Plans 
Yes, following the trend of the Eleventh Five-Year Plans, regional imbalance is 
addressed in both the Twelfth and Thirteenth national plans. Among the 168 strategies in 
the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, 26 (15.5%) strategies have clear regional implications. 
Among the 26 strategies that do have regional implications, 13(50%) strategies benefit 
 
9 Proportion tests were performed to determine which plans’ “Red” and “Rei” have higher percentages. The 
contingency tables used are listed above. 
The first proportion test, with p-value 0.02202 rejects the null of hypothesis of identical distribution across 
national and provincial plans. It supports the claim that national plans’ Red percentage is significantly 
higher than the provincial plans’ Red percentage. 
The second proportion test with p value 0.000285 supports the claim that national plans’ Red percentage is 
significantly higher than the city plans’ Red percentage.  
The third proportion test with p value 0.06156 fails to reject the null hypothesis of the identical proportion. 
It supports the claim that the provincial plans’ Red percentage is not significantly different from the city 
plans’ Red percentage.  
The fourth proportion test with p value 0.2794 fails to reject the null hypothesis of the identical proportions. 
It supports the claim that the national plans’ Rei percentage is not significantly different than the provincial 
plans’ Rei percentage.  
The fifth proportion test with p value 0.05393 fails to reject the null hypothesis of the identical proportions. 
It supports the claim that the national plans’ Rei percentage is not significantly different than the city plans’ 
Rei percentage. The p value of the last test equals 0.123 which fails to reject the null hypothesis of the 
identical proportion. It supports the claim that the provincial plans’ Rei percentage is not significantly 
different than the city plans’ Rei percentage. 
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the western and central regions, and 10 (38.5%) benefit the Eastern region. There are 
more strategies supporting the lagging western and central regions.  
In the Thirteenth National Five-Year Plans, 25 strategies (10.3%) among 243 
strategies are related to the regional issues. While regional imbalance is addressed in the 
Thirteenth National Five-Year Plan, it’s not prioritized because of the low percentage. 
Among the 25 strategies that do have clear regional implications, 12 (48.0%) strategies 
benefit the western and central regions, and 10 (40.0%) benefit the eastern region. There 
are more strategies that aim to support the western and central regions than the eastern 
region.  
 
Table 4.7 National Five-Year Plans’ Regional Implications 
 





















12th Plan 168 10 13 3 142 
13th Plan 243 10 12 3 218 
Total 411 20 25 6 360 
  
 
Decreased from the Twelfth plan’s 15% to Thirteenth plan’s 10%, the strategies 
that address the regional issues have remained peripheral in the national five-year plans. 
Among the strategies do deal with regional issues, in both plans, there are more strategies 
that benefit the western and central regions than the eastern region. It shows that regional 
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imbalance has been addressed in the national five-year plans even though it’s not of 
central importance. The strategies that aim to support the western and central regions 
include sustainable agriculture development, additional human talent allocation,  
transportation network improvement, prioritizing Western region for large-scale projects 
and making sure the Belt and the Road initiative implemented in the region, supporting 
ethnic minority areas, encouraging more foreign capital investments, more supports for 
education especially higher education, and healthcare service development. The strategies 
that benefit the Eastern region propose pushing agglomeration of service industries in the 
coastal regions, deepening the opening-up of the coastal regions, promoting integrated 
development of Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei province, strengthening the ocean economy, 
and supporting Hongkong, Macao, and Taiwan province.  
 
The Thirteenth Five-Year Plan’s Urban and Rural Implications  
National Plans 
Yes, the rural and urban imbalance is addressed in both the Twelfth and 
Thirteenth National Five-Year plans. In the Twelfth national five-year plan there are 40 
strategies (23.8%) among 168 strategies in which key words “rural” or “urban” is 
identified. Among the 40 strategies that do have clear rural and urban implications, 24 
strategies (60.0%) benefit the rural areas, 8 strategies (20.0%) benefit the urban areas, 
and 8 strategies (20.0%) support both the urban and rural areas in them. There are much 
more strategies supporting the rural areas than the urban areas. It can be argued that in the 
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Twelfth National Five-Year Plan, the rural areas are prioritized and given more attention 
and supports than the urban areas.   
In the Thirteenth National Five-Year Plan, there are 47 strategies (19.3%) among 
243 strategies in which key words “rural” or “urban” is identified. Among the 47 
strategies that do deal with urban and rural issues, 25 strategies (53.2%) benefit the rural 
areas, 17 strategies (36.2%) benefit the urban areas, and 5 (10.6%) benefit both of them. 
There are more strategies benefiting the rural areas than the urban areas which supports 
the claim that rural areas are prioritized and given more attention. However, the 17% 
difference is much smaller than the 40% difference in the Twelfth plan. Compared with 
the Twelfth plan, the deemphasis of farmers and rural areas is clear in the Thirteenth 
national plan. As argued earlier, the specific emphasis of rural areas and farmers in the 
Twelfth plan is shifted to a more general emphasis of poverty and innovation in the 
Thirteenth plan. The goals that benefit the rural areas are shared by both plans which 
include agriculture development, expanding farmers’ income sources, better the living 
and productive environment, ecological protection and restoration, rural education 
reform, basic public service improvement, rural land reform, household registration 
reform, and coordinated urban and rural development. The goals that benefit the urban 
areas are shared by both plans and propose to develop county economies, city 
transportation, technological innovation systems in cities, harmonious cities, urban 
infrastructure, and integrated Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei.   
 




































12th Plan 168 8 24 8 128 
13th Plan 243 17 25 5 196 




Yes, the rural and urban imbalance is addressed in all 6 provincial Thirteenth five-
year plans. In the provincial plans, there are 159 strategies (19.6%) among 811 strategies 
in which key words “rural” or “urban” is identified. Among the 159 strategies that do 
have rural and urban implications, 92 strategies (57.9%) benefit the rural areas, 43 
strategies (27.0%) benefit the urban areas, and 24 strategies (15.1%) support both areas. 
There are much more strategies supporting the rural areas than the urban areas. It can be 
argued that in the provincial Thirteenth Five-Year Plans, the rural areas are prioritized 
and given more attention and supports than the urban areas.  The goals that benefit the 
rural areas are shared by most provincial plans which include agriculture development, 
unified urban and rural development, expanding farmers’ income sources, rural education 
improvement, village beautification, human-centered urbanization, targeted poverty 
reduction, cultural development supports, and rural land reform.  The goals that benefit 
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the urban areas are also mostly shared in the provincial plans which include innovative 
industrial development in cities, urban transportation development, cities as growth poles, 
integrated development of Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei, urban spatial layout optimization, 
provincial capital development, regional development for cities, urban public service 
improvement, cultural industrial development in cities, urban industrial cluster 
development and better urban infrastructure.   
 




























for the rural 
and urban 
areas 
(U) (R) (G) (NA) 
Jiangsu E 112 6 13 7 86 
Hebei  E 110 6 13 6 85 
Jiangxi  C 174 9 21 1 143 
Heilongjiang  C 57 6 9 0 42 
Neimenggu W 141 4 12 3 122 
Yunnan  W 217 12 24 7 174 
Total   811 43 92 24 652 
 
 
A chi-square test, with p-value 0.9597 fails to reject the null of hypothesis of 
identical distribution across national and provincial level and supports the claim that in 
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the National and Provincial plans, the strategies’ urban and rural implication distributions 
are homogenous. 10 
City Plans 
Yes, the rural and urban imbalance is addressed all 12 city Thirteenth five-year 
plans. In the city Thirteenth Five-Year Plans there are 297 strategies (29.7%) among 
1001 strategies in which key words “rural” or “urban” is identified. Among the 254 
strategies that do have rural and urban implications, 112 strategies (37.7%) benefit the 
rural areas, 53 strategies (17.8%) benefit the urban areas, and 89 (30.0%) strategies 
support both areas. There are much more strategies supporting the rural areas than the 
urban areas. It can be argued that in the city Thirteenth Five-Year Plans, the rural areas 
are prioritized and given more attention and supports than the urban areas.  The goals that 
benefit the rural areas include agriculture development, rural spatial layout optimization, 
rural land reform, village beautification, farmers’ income improvement, poverty 
reduction, better healthcare, rural education, training for using information technology, 
unified urban and rural development, social security programs, ecological industrial 
development, and rural institution reform to help the poor. The goals that focus on the 
urban areas propose optimization of urban spatial layout, improving service functions of 
city cores, improving urban transportation, cities as growth-poles, livable and ecological 
cities, old town regeneration, new town development, industrial agglomeration, city 
beautification, and increasing urban residents’ income. 
 
10 A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies’ urban and rural 
implication distributions are identical or not across national and provincial level with RStudio (version, 
1.2.5033). The contingency table used is listed above. 
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Table 4.10 The City Plan’s Urban and Rural Implications 
 
City Name Province Total U R G NA 
Changzhou  Jiangsu 131 5 14 8 104 
Lianyungang  Jiangsu 111 7 14 10 80 
Tangshan  Hebei  109 6 12 4 87 
Hengshui  Hebei  93 2 11 1 79 
Jiujiang  Jiangxi  118 11 11 7 89 
Nanchang  Jiangxi  41 5 8 10 18 
Shuangyashan  Heilongjiang  21 0 3 5 13 
Yichun  Heilongjiang  93 8 6 4 75 
Bayannaoer  Neimenggu  71 2 9 8 19 
Tongliao  Neimenggu 110 4 11 8 77 
Yuxi  Yunnan  41 1 3 11 26 
Zhaotong  Yunnan  62 2 10 13 37 
Total   1001 53 112 89 704 
 
 
A chi-square test, with p-value 0.00002377 rejects the null of hypothesis of 
identical distribution across national, provincial, and city plans.  11 
The first proportion test with p value of 0.4607 fails to reject the null of 
hypothesis of identical distribution across national and provincial plans. 12 
 
11 A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies’ urban and rural 
implication distributions are identical or not across national, provincial, and city level with RStudio 
(version, 1.2.5033). The contingency table used is listed above. The test supports the claim that the 
strategies’ urban and rural implication distributions are significantly different. Proportion tests were 
performed to determine which level’s plans have higher U and R’s percentages. The contingency tables 
used are listed above. 
12 The first proportion test compared national plans with province plans in terms of their implications for 
the urban and rural areas. The p value of the test is 0.4607 that is bigger than 0.05 and consistent with the 
chi square test done in the last section.  It fails to reject the null of hypothesis of identical distribution 
across national and province level. It supports the claim that in the National and Province plans, the 
strategies’ urban and rural implication distributions are homogenous. 
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The second and third proportion test with p value of 0.03235 and 0.004373 both 
support the claim that in the national and province plans, the R’s percentages are higher 
than the city plans’ R percentage.13 
To conclude, in all of the Thirteenth five-year plans, there are more strategies 
supporting the rural areas than the urban areas. It can be argued at least judging from plan 
strategy percentages, the rural areas are prioritized and given more attention and supports 
than the urban areas in China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plans.   
 
Class Interest and the Five-Year Plans 
National Plans 
In the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, 36 strategies (21.4%) among 168 strategies 
directly benefit the capitalist class while 27 strategies (16.1%) directly benefit the 
working class. 105 strategies (62.5%) don’t favor any class and broadly benefit the 
general public.   
In the Thirteenth National Five-Year Plan, 47 strategies (19.3%) among 243 
strategies directly benefit the capitalist class while 32 strategies (13.1%) favor the 
working class. 164 strategies (67.5%) are for the interests of the general public. As 
defined in the earlier section, “directly benefitting” means the group, according to the 
 
13 The second and third proportion test examine whether the R’s percentages are higher in the national 
plans and province plans than in the city plans. The first test’s p value equals 0.03235 and the second p 
value equals 0.004373. Both values are smaller than 0.05. They support the claim that in both national and 
province plans, the R’s percentages are higher than the city plans’ R percentage. It can be argued that the 
urban and rural imbalance is given more attention in the national and province plans than in the city plans 
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plan’s texts, will directly receive supports as written in the plan texts. The words 
“support” or the words with similar meanings must be identified in the plan texts. 
 
Table 4.11 National Five-Year Plan’s Class Implications 
 












12th Plan 168 34 31 103 
  20.2% 18.5% 61.6% 
13th Plan 243 47 32 164 
  19.3% 13.1% 67.5% 
Total 411 81 63 267 
  19.7% 15.3% 65.0% 
 
 
Comparing the percentages of the strategies that benefit the capitalist class, 
working class, and the public, it’s found that in both national plans, the biggest policy 
beneficiary group is the general public which accounts for about 65.0% of all national 
strategies. In both the Twelfth and Thirteenth national plan, there are more strategies that 
directly benefit the capitalist class than the working class. However, the percentage 
differences are only about 5 percentage. It can be argued that at least judging from the 
strategy percentages, the interests of the two classes are both well represented in the two 
national plans. Neither the capitalist nor working class interests dominate the national 
plans.  
The strategies benefiting the capitalist class are mostly shared by both plans 
which include upgrading and restructuring industries such as manufacturing industry, 
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optimizing industrial layout, strengthening the innovation of enterprises, guiding 
enterprise annexation and reorganization, promoting development of mid and small-size 
enterprises, supporting exporting industries, financial market system development, 
enterprise brand building, lowering business costs, fostering development of new 
strategic industries, and bettering business environment. 
The strategies benefiting the working class are mostly shared by both plans which 
include agriculture development, rural development, expanding farmers’ income sources, 
strengthening public services for employment, constructing harmonious capital-labor 
relations, reforming wage systems, bettering redistribution mechanisms, developing 
social welfare and charity systems, poverty reduction programs, and workplace safety. 
Comparing the Twelfth and Thirteenth plan, it’s found that the two plans’ class 
implication distributions are similar. In the Twelfth plan, the percentage proportion is 
about 1.3: 1: 3.9, and in the Thirteenth, the proportion is 1.5: 1: 4.5.  
A chi-square test, with p-value 0.2742 fails to reject the null of hypothesis of 
identical distribution across the two national plans. It means, compared the workers and 
the general public, the capitalist class doesn’t benefit more in the Thirteenth National 
Plan than the Twelfth National Plan. 14 
 
14 A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies’ class implication 
distributions are identical or not across the two national plans with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The 
contingency table used is listed above. The test supports the claim that in the Twelfth and Thirteenth plan, 
the strategies’ class implication distributions are homogenous 
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Provincial Plans 
In the provincial plans, 146 strategies (18%) among 811 strategies directly benefit 
the capitalist class while 27 strategies (16.1%) directly benefit the working class. 105 
strategies (62.5%) don’t favor any class and broadly benefit the interests of the general 
public. 
 












Total Cap Wor G 
Jiangsu E H 112 31 20 61 
        27.7% 17.9% 54.5% 
Hebei  E L 110 29 17 64 
        26.4% 15.4% 58.1% 
Jiangxi  C H 174 29 37 108 
        16.7% 21.3% 62.1% 
Heilongjiang  C L 57 11 9 37 
        19.3% 15.8% 64.9% 
Neimenggu  W H 141 27 20 94 
        19.2% 14.2% 66.7% 
Yunnan W L 217 19 25 173 
        8.7% 11.5% 79.7% 
Total     811 146 128 537 
        18.0% 15.8% 66.2% 
 
 
Comparing the percentages of the strategies that benefit the capitalist class, 
working class, and the public, it’s found that in the Thirteenth provincial plans, the 
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biggest policy beneficiary group is the general public which accounts for about 66.2% of 
all strategies. In all provincial plans except in Yunnan and Jiangxi’s plan, have relatively 
more strategies benefiting the capitalist class than the working class. However, in the 811 
strategies in the provincial plans, the percentage difference between the two classes is 
only 2.2%. It can be argued that at least judging from the strategy percentages, the 
interests of the two classes are both well represented in the provincial plans. Neither the 
capitalist nor working class interests dominate the province plans.  
The strategies benefiting the capitalist class include fostering innovative clusters 
of enterprises, industrial innovation, cities as innovation centers, building internationally 
competitive advanced manufacturing bases and strategically new industries, upgrading 
and restructuring of the economy, attracting and utilizing foreign capital, building great 
environment for businesses, fostering the growth of  investors who invest overseas, 
bettering service and institutions for innovation and entrepreneurs, development of new 
strategic industries, supporting business brand building, marketization of public 
allocation of resources, development of the private sector, integration with the Belt and 
the Road initiative. The strategies benefiting the working class include development of 
human talents, fostering new generations of farmers, agriculture development, poverty 
reduction programs, supporting farmers to migrate to urban areas, rural development, 
employment supports, social assistance programs, income redistribution, social welfare 
systems, expansion of public services, job training programs, harmonious capital-labor 
relations, wage increasing, and modern vocation school systems. These strategies are also 
mostly shared by the two national plans. 
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National and provincial plans’ class implication distributions are very similar. In 
the national plans, the percentage proportion is about 1.3: 1: 4.2. In the provincial plans, 
the proportion is 1.1: 1: 4.2.  
A chi-square test, with p-value 0.7679 fails to reject the null of hypothesis of 
identical distribution across national and provincial plans. It means, compared the 
workers and the general public, the capitalist class doesn’t benefit more in the provincial 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plans than in the national plans. 15 
Comparing higher economic performance provinces’ plans with lower ones’ 
plans, defined by their GDP, GDP per capita, and the percentage of the workforce 
employed by the private industrial sector, as discussed in the sampling section, it’s found 
that their class implication distributions are homogenous across the two groups. The 
high-performance provinces are Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Neimenggu province. The low 
performance group include Hebei, Heilongjiang, and Yunnan province.  
A chi-square test, with p-value 0.06668 supports the claim that in both high and 
low economic performance provinces’ plans, the strategies’ class implication 
distributions are homogenous. It means, compared the workers and the general public, the 
capitalist class doesn’t benefit more in the high-performance provinces’ plans than the 
low-performance provinces’ plans. 16 
 
15 A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies’ class implication 
distributions are identical or not across national and provincial plans with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The 
contingency table used is listed above. The test supports the claim that in national and province plans, the 
strategies’ class implication distributions are homogenous. 
16 A chi-square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies’ class implication 
distributions are identical or not across the two groups with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The contingency 
table used is listed above. 
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Comparing the plans of eastern, central, and western region in terms of their class 
implications at province level, it’s found that their class implication distributions are 
significantly different. 
A chi-square test, with p-value 0.0000002105 rejects the null of hypothesis of 
identical distribution across the regions. 17 
Proportion tests were performed to determine which plan’s Cap has higher 
percentages among the three regions. The three proportion tests support the claim that the 
capitalist class benefits significantly more in the Eastern region’s plans than in the 
Western and Central region’s plans.18 
City Plans 
In the city plans 195 (19.5%) strategies among 1001 strategies directly benefit the 
capitalist class and 131 (13.1%) strategies directly benefit the working class. 723 (72.2%) 
strategies don’t favor any class and broadly benefit the interests of the general public. 
 
Table 4.13 City Five-Year Plan’s Class Implications 
 
17 A chi-square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies’ class implication 
distributions are identical or not across the regions’ plans with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The 
contingency table used is listed below. The test supports the claim the plan strategies’ class implication 
distributions are significantly different. 
18 The p value of the first test equals 0.00003606 which is less than 0.05. It supports the claim that plans of 
the Eastern region have higher percentage of Cap than the plans of the Central region. It means judging 
from plan strategies’ percentages, the capitalist class benefits more in the Eastern region’s plans than in the 
Central region’s plans. 
The p value of the second test equals 0.0000000379 which is less than 0.05. It supports the claim that 
Eastern region plans have higher percentage of Cap than the Western region. It means judging from plan 
strategies’ percentages, the capitalist class benefits more in the Eastern region’s plans than in the Western 
region’s plans. 
The p value of the third test equals 0.16 which is bigger than 0.05. It supports the claim that the percentage 
of the Cap is not significantly higher in the Central region’s plans than in the Western region’s plans. It 
means judging from the plans’ strategy percentages, the capitalist class doesn’t benefit differently in the 
Central region’s plans and in the Western region’s plans. 
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City Name Province Total Region H/L Cap Wor G 
Changzhou  Jiangsu 131 E H 24 18 89 
          18.3% 13.7% 67.9% 
Lianyungang  Jiangsu 111 E L 20 13 78 
          18.0% 11.7% 70.3% 
Tangshan  Hebei  109 E H 27 9 73 
          24.8% 8.3% 67.0% 
Hengshui  Hebei  93 E L 21 14 58 
          22.6% 15.1% 62.4% 
Jiujiang  Jiangxi  118 C H 22 17 79 
          18.6% 14.4% 66.9% 
Nanchang  Jiangxi  41 C L 9 5 27 
          22.0% 12.2% 65.9% 
Shuangyashan  Heilongjiang  21 C H 6 4 11 
          28.6% 19.0% 52.4% 
Yichun  Heilongjiang  93 C L 16 7 70 
          17.2% 7.5% 75.3% 
Bayannaoer  Neimenggu  71 W H 17 10 44 
          23.9% 14.1% 62.0% 
Tongliao  Neimenggu 110 W L 14 20 76 
          12.7% 18.2% 69.1% 
Yuxi  Yunnan  41 W H 8 4 29 
          19.5% 9.8% 70.7% 
Zhaotong  Yunnan  62 W L 11 10 41 
          17.7% 16.1% 66.1% 
Total   1001     195 131 675 
          19.5% 13.1% 67.4% 
 
 
Comparing the percentages of the strategies that benefit the capitalist class, the 
working class, and the public, it’s found that in the city plans, the biggest policy 
beneficiary group is the general public which accounts for about 67% of all city plans’ 
strategies. The finding is consistent across the national, provincial, and city plans. All city 
plans except Tongliao plan have relatively more strategies benefiting the capitalist class 
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than working class. However, in the 1001 strategies of all city plans, the percentage 
difference between the two classes is only 6%. It can be argued that at least judging from 
the strategy percentages, the interests of the two classes are both well represented. 
Neither the capitalist nor working class interests dominate the city plans.  
The strategies benefiting the capitalist class are mostly shared by the national, 
provincial, and city plans which include guiding the spatial layout of manufacturing 
industry, promoting clustered development of service industry, supporting enterprises to 
build their brands, construction of innovative industrial parks, promoting the 
development of local financial systems, supporting the development of the private sector, 
industry upgrading and restructuring, plans for enterprise expansion and growth, building 
new comparative advantages in foreign trade, attracting more foreign capital, 
strengthening logistic industry, increasing competitiveness of enterprises, enterprise 
innovation, promoting clustered industrial development, business recruitment, 
marketization of public resource allocation, and strengthening construction industry. 
The strategies benefiting the working class are also shared for the most part by the 
national, provincial, and city plans which include agriculture development, rural 
development, human talent development and attraction, assisting farmers’ migration to 
become urban citizens, income redistribution to benefit the mid and low-income groups, 
more stable employment, poverty reduction, bettering social security system, more 
allocation of public service to disadvantaged groups, developing mechanisms to increase 
people's wages, and bettering job services.  
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Comparing the national, provincial, and city plans, it’s found that the plans’ class 
implication distributions are similar. In the national plans, the percentage proportion is 
about 1.3: 1:4.2. In the provincial plans, the proportion is 1.1:1:4.2. And in the city plans, 
it is 1.5:1:5.1. 
A chi-square test, with p-value 0.4875 fails to reject the null of hypothesis of 
identical distribution across the national, provincial, and city plans. It means, compared 
the working class and the general public, the capitalist class doesn’t benefit more in the 
city Thirteenth Five-Year Plans than at the provincial and national plans. 19 
Comparing the higher economic performance cities with the lower ones, as 
defined by city’s GDP, GDP per capita, and the percentage of the workforce employed by 
the private industrial sector, it’s found that their class implication distributions are 
homogenous. 20  
A chi-square test, with p-value 0.3721 supports the claim that in both high and 
low economic performance city plans, the strategies’ class implication distributions are 
homogenous. It means, compared with the workers and the general public, the capitalist 
class doesn’t benefit more in the high-performance cities’ plans than in the low-
performance cities’ plans.21 
 
19 A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies’ class implication 
distributions are identical or not across national and province plans with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The 
contingency table used is listed above. The test supports the claim that in the national, province, and city 
plans, the strategies’ class implication distributions are homogenous. 
20 The high economic performance cities are Changzhou, Tangshan, Jiujiang, Shuangyashan, Baoyannaoer, 
and Yuxi. The low economic performance cities include Lianyungang, Hengshui, Nanchang, Yichun, 
Tongliao, and Zhaotong. 
21 A chi-Square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies’ class implication 
distributions are identical or not across national and province plans with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The 
contingency table used is listed above. 
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Comparing the plans from the eastern, central, and western region in terms of 
their class implications at city level, it’s found that their class implication distributions 
are homogenous. 
A chi-square test with p value 0.6123 fails to reject the null of hypothesis of 
identical distribution across the regions in the city plans. It supports the claim that the 
plans’ strategies’ class implication distributions are homogenous across regions in the 
city plans. 22  
 
Application of the Boolean Approach  
Why Boolean Approach 
There are two reasons for using the Boolean approach in my research. First, my 
research sample size is relatively small and it’s not appropriate for regression analysis. 
The minimum sample size for linear regression modeling, as a rule of thumb, should be 
no less than 50 (Green, 1991). My sample size of city plan evaluation is 27. Even if 
regression model can be formed, the statistic power of the inference will be low.  
However, the Boolean approach works well with small sample size because it uses 
Boolean algebra and does not make statistical inference. 
Second, Marxist theories of state indicate that class struggle is the key that 
determines the state’s policy orientation (Clarke, 1991). For example, Chan and Hui 
(2017, p.234) state argue that  
 
22 A chi-square test of homogeneity was performed to compare whether the strategies’ class implication 
distributions are identical or not across the regions with RStudio (version, 1.2.5033). The contingency table 
used is listed above. 
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“Chinese state’s social policies and development strategies often reflect its response 
to emerging class struggles within then limit set up by the capitalist social relations 
of production…… Chinese state does not simply reflect the capitalist class’s 
interests. It is a field of class struggles and its policies are simultaneously shaped 
by capital and labour…… An increase in workers’ organizational and structural 
power subjects the state to greater pressure to respond to worker demands and thus 
reduces its previous pro-capital orientation in policy- and law-making.” (Chen and 
Hui (2017, p.234). 
 
The theories recognize the importance of class struggle in China but it is stated in 
a broad way. One of the strengths of the Boolean approach to case comparison is to 
elaborate theories and delineate the scope conditions of the causal variables (Ragin, 
1987). In my research, assuming significant differences exist between plan analysis 
results, the Boolean approach is used to elaborate the causal relationships between the 
results and class struggle. The city plans are selected because capitalist political 
participation theories suggested that capitalists were more active at local level (Schubert 
& Heberer, 2017). 
An Introduction of a Boolean Approach to Case Comparison  
A Boolean approach to case comparison is adopted to explore potential 
determining conditions of the variations of class interest analysis (Ragin, 1987).  I will 
first introduce the Boolean approach proposed by Ragin (1987) and then I will describe 




Ragin (1987) listed three features of social phenomenon that make their causal 
links complex.   
“First, rarely does an outcome of interest to social scientists have a single 
cause…… Second, causes rarely operate in isolation. Usually, it is the combined 
effects of various conditions, their intersection in time and space, that produces a 
certain outcome. Thus, social causation is often both multiple and conjunctural, 
involving different combinations of causal conditions. Third, a specific cause may 
have opposite effects depending on context…… The fact that some conditions have 
contradictory effects depending on context further complicates the identification of 
empirical regularities……” (Ragin, 1987, p.27)  
  
 The Boolean approach is designed to deal with this multiple and conjunctural 
causal complexity.  
Key Concepts and Procedures of Boolean Approach 
 (1) “Use of Binary Data” (Ragin, 1987, p.86): 
The Boolean approach is used to explore the causal relationships between 
outcome variables and condition variables identified by theories. It requires both outcome 
and condition variables to be binary. For example, a researcher interested in exploring the 
relationship between neighborhood poverty, and crime rates, and neighborhood 
organization would code the neighborhood poverty variable as binary, such as 
impoverished represented by “1” and “not” by “0”. Crime rates could be coded as “high” 
and “low” with “high” represented by “1” and “low” by “0”. Neighborhood organization 
presence must also be binary. When an organization exists, the case can be coded as 
“yes” with “1”; when no organization exists, the case can be coded as “no”, with “o”.  
(2) “Use of Truth Table to Represent Data” (Ragin, 1987, p,87): 
 92 
Ragin (1987, p.87) argued that “in order to use Boolean algebra as a technique of 
qualitative comparison, it is necessary to reconstruct a raw data matrix as a truth table”. 
Using the hypothetical example above, I will show how to reconstruct a true table to 
represent binary data.  
Table 4.14 An Example of True Table  








4 0 0 0 
5 0 1 0 
4 1 0 1 
2 1 1 1 
 
 
All possible combinations of the independent variables are listed and then 
followed by outcomes. For example, in the first row, it shows that in four cases, when 
crime rates are low and there are no neighborhood organizations, poverty is not present in 
the four cases.  
(3) “Boolean Addition” (Ragin, 1987, p.89) 
Boolean addition is applied to formulate Boolean expressions to represent causal 
relationships between variables.  
 
“In Boolean algebra, if A + B = Z, and A = 1 and B = 1, then Z = 1. The basic idea 
in Boolean addition is that if any of the additive terms is satisfied (present), then 
the outcome is true (occurs)…… A + B = Z becomes: if A equals 1 OR B equals 1, 
then Z equals 1” (Ragin, 1987, p.89).  
 
(4) Boolean Multiplication  
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Ragin (1987, p. 91) stated that “a product is a specific combination of causal 
conditions. With uppercase letter indicating presence and lower letters indicating 
absence”. The true table above can be written as a primitive statement, “P = Cn+ CN”. 
(“P” = presence of poverty and “p” = absence; “C” = high crime rates and “c” = low 
crime rates; “N” = presence of neighborhood organizations and “n” = absence) 
(5) Boolean Minimization 
The process of minimization is a key procedure in Boolean approach and the 
results of the process express different combinations of causal relationships.  
 
“If two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition yet produce the 
same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions can 
be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined 
expression” (Ragin, 1987, p.93). 
 
For example, the primitive Boolean statement, P = Cn + CN can be reduced and 
written as P = C. The causal relationship between P, C, and N is shown by the reduced 
equation, P = C. It gives new information compared with the primitive expression, “P = 
Cn + CN”. This minimization process is essential for theory building.  
 (6) Necessary and Sufficient Causes 
Ragin (1987, p. 99-100) summarized four types of causal relationships:  
 
“A cause is both necessary and sufficient if it is the only cause that produces an 
outcome and it is singular. A cause is sufficient but not necessary if it is capable of 
producing the outcome but is not the only cause with this capability. A cause is 
necessary but not sufficient if it is capable of producing an outcome in combination 
with other causes and appears in all such combinations. Finally, a cause is neither 
necessary nor sufficient if it appears only in a subset of the combinations of 
conditions that produce an outcome” (Ragin, 1987, p. 99-100). 
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The causal relationships identified by Boolean analysis include the four types. I 
will show the four types with a new example. (For example, here B= presence of broad 
community participation, b= low community participation) 
 P = NC + Bc (No cause is either necessary or sufficient)  
 P = NC + BC (C is necessary but not sufficient) 
 P = NC (Both N and C are necessary but not sufficient) 
 P = A + Bc (A is sufficient but not necessary) 
  P = B (B is both necessary and sufficient) 
 
Application of the Boolean Approach 
The Use of Binary Data: 
The binary outcome variable describes the difference between the percentages of 
the strategy that benefits the capitalist class and the percentages that benefit the working 
class in China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plan at city level.  All 12 cities’ percentage 
differences were calculated and ranked.  The top 50% cities were coded as “high” and 
represented by “1” while the bottom 50% were coded as “low” and represented by “0”. 
 
Table 4.15 Twelve City Plans’ Class Implication Distributions 
 




Tangshan  Hebei  24.8% 8.3% 67.0% 16.5% 1 
Bayannaoer  Neimenggu  23.9% 14.1% 62.0% 9.9% 1 
Nanchang  Jiangxi  22.0% 12.2% 65.9% 9.8% 1 
Yuxi  Yunnan  19.5% 9.8% 70.7% 9.8% 1 
Yichun  Heilongjiang  17.2% 7.5% 75.3% 9.7% 1 
Shuangyashan  Heilongjiang  28.6% 19.0% 52.4% 9.5% 1 
Hengshui  Hebei  22.6% 15.1% 62.4% 7.5% 0 
Lianyungang  Jiangsu 18.0% 11.7% 70.3% 6.3% 0 
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Changzhou  Jiangsu 18.3% 13.7% 67.9% 4.6% 0 
Jiujiang  Jiangxi  18.6% 14.4% 66.9% 4.2% 0 
Zhaotong  Yunnan  17.7% 16.1% 66.1% 1.6% 0 
Tongliao  Neimenggu 12.7% 18.2% 69.1% -5.5% 0 
 
 
Three condition variables were selected to describe class struggle. The first 
variable concerns the number of labor strikes that had happened in the city from 2011-
2015. This period of time is when all five-year plans were being made. The frequency of 
the labor strike is used to show the strength of the working class in class struggle. All 12 
cities’ labor strike numbers were ranked and the top 50% were coded as “high” and 
represented by “1” while the bottom 50% were coded as “low” and represented by “0”. 
The data was extracted from China Labor Bulletin.23 It’s a website which collects 
information and records labor actions in China. The second variable describes the 
importance of the private sector for local economies which is used to indicates the 
strength of the capitalists. All 12 cities’ percentages of private sector employment in local 
economies from 2011 to 2015 were ranked and the top 50% ones were coded as ‘high” 
and represented by “1” while the bottom 50% were coded as “low” and represented by 
“0”. The last variable shows local economic changes from 2011 to 2015. All 12 cities’ 
annual GDP growth rate changes from 2011 to 2015 were calculated and ranked. The top 
50% were coded as ‘high” variation and represented by “1” while the bottom 50% were 
 





coded as “low” variation and represented by “0”. The variable is selected because 
theories suggested that economic changes can influence the power balance between labor 
and capital (Chan & Hui, 2017). Workers tend to gain more power to negotiate with 
capitalists when labor supply is low and demand is high.  
Truth Table: 
 All combinations of the condition variables are listed as follows. I will first 
formulate a primitive Boolean expression to describe the causal relationships between the 
variables. Then will perform Boolean minimization and get reduced equations. With the 
reduced equation, I will show how the results are connected to the class struggle theory in 
the context of Chinese cities. 
 
 
Table 4.16 A Summary of the Condition Variables 
 


































Bayannaoer  Neimenggu  4 718 887 0.24 0.8 
Yuxi  Yunnan  5 876 1244 0.42 0.64 
Tangshan  Hebei  61 5442 6050 0.11 0.63 
Jiujiang  Jiangxi  13 1256 1909 0.52 0.61 





6 472 433 -0.08 0.51 
Tongliao  Neimenggu 6 1448 1877 0.30 0.43 
Hengshui  Hebei  17 929 1220 0.31 0.42 
Nanchang  Jiangxi  18 2560 4000 0.56 0.37 
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Zhaotong  Yunnan  5 465 708 0.52 0.28 




18 230 248 0.08 0.15 
 
Data Sources: China National Bureau of Statistics, 2011, 2015 
 
 






% GDP change Cap-Wor Diff 
Tangshan  1 1 0 1 
Bayannaoer  0 1 0 1 
Nanchang  1 0 1 1 
Yuxi  0 1 1 1 
Yichun  1 0 0 1 
Shuangyashan  0 1 0 1 
Hengshui  1 0 0 0 
Lianyungang  0 0 1 0 
Changzhou  1 1 1 0 
Jiujiang  1 1 1 0 
Zhaotong  0 0 1 0 
Tongliao  0 0 0 0 
 
 















1 0 0 0 0 
2 0 0 1 0 
 0 1 0 0 
 0 1 1 0 
1 1 0 0 0 
 1 0 1 0 
 1 1 0 0 
2 1 1 1 0 
 0 0 0 1 
 0 0 1 1 
2 0 1 0 1 
1 0 1 1 1 
1 1 0 0 1 
1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 1 0 1 
 1 1 1 1 
 
 
Primitive Boolean Expressions 
The following primitive Boolean Expression was constructed according to the 
truth table above. “i” means the percentage difference between the strategies that benefit 
the capitalist class and the working class is low. “I” means the percentage difference 
between the strategies that benefit the capitalist class and the working class is high. “b” 
means the city’s labor strike numbers are relatively low and “B” means the city’s labor 
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strike numbers are relatively high. “r” means the city’s employment contributed by the 
private sector is relatively low and “R” means the city’s employment contributed by the 
private sector is relatively high. “e” means the city’s GDP growth from 2011 to 2015 is 
relatively low and “E” means the city’s GDP growth from 2011 to 2015 is relatively high.  
(1) i= bre + brE +Bre + BRE 
(2) I= bRe + bRE + Bre + BrE + BRe 
Boolean minimization 
 
The law of minimization states that, 
 
 “if two Boolean expressions differ in only one causal condition yet produce the 
same outcome, then the causal condition that distinguishes the two expressions can 
be considered irrelevant and can be removed to create a simpler, combined 
expression (Ragin, 1987, p.93).” 
 
Two equations were produced by applying the law of minimization. 
(3) i = br + re + BRE 
(4) I = bR + Re + Br + Be 
The second phase of minimization is to minimize the number of the prime 
implicants, which are br, re, BRE, bR, Re, Br, and Be. A prime implicant chart is used to 
reduce the prime implicants that can be covered by other prime implicants. 
 
Table 4.19 Prime Implicant Chart Showing Coverage of Original Terms  
 
 bRe bRE Bre BrE BRe 
bR      
Re      
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Br      
Be      
 
 
The chart shows that the first three prime implicants cover all of the terms which 
makes the fourth one, “Be”, redundant. Thus, the second equation can be reduced as 
follows.  
(5) I = bR + Re + Br 
The final two equations after the minimization are listed as follows. 
(3) i = br + re + BRE    
(5) I = bR + Re + Br     
The Interpretation of the Minimized Equations 
First, there is no condition variable that is either necessary or sufficient because 
all terms in the two equations, (3) and (5), contain combinations of causes.  
Second, equation (3) shows that there are three types of combinations that 
produce the result of relatively low percentage difference between the strategies that 
benefit the capitalist class and the strategies that benefit the working class. The relatively 
low percentage difference indicates similar representation of the two classes in the plans. 
The first is when the city’s frequency of labor strikes is low and the private sector 
employment percentage is low. The second is when the city’s private sector employment 
percentage is low and economic growth is low. The third is when labor strike frequency 
is high, private sector employment is high, and economic growth is high.  
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The condition variable of private sector employment percentage appears in all 
three terms and it has contrary effects in different situations. When labor strike frequency 
is low, and economic growth is low, in both situations, the presence of weak private 
sector causes similar representation of the capitalist class and working class in the 
Thirteenth five-year plans. When labor strike frequency is high and economic growth is 
high, the presence of strong private sector also produces similar representation of the 
capitalist class and working class in the Thirteenth five-year plans. The analysis indicates 
the importance of private sector employment to the outcome variable and its contrary 
effects on the outcome. 
The importance of the private sector employment percentage is also observed in 
the equation (5). It appears in all three terms in the equation. When labor strike is low, the 
presence of strong private sector leads to high percentage difference between the 
strategies that benefit the capitalist class and the strategies that benefit the working class. 
When economic growth is low, the presence of strong private sector causes high 
difference between the two types of the strategies in the plans. The two terms in the 
equation (5) are exactly contrary to the first two terms in the equation (3) and they 
produce exactly contrary outcomes. This shows a relatively stable relationship between 
the four variables. And this relationship supports existing theories and can also be 
explained by extant theories.  
As mentioned earlier, the Marxist theories stress the importance of class struggle 
in public policy making. For example, Chen and Hui (2017, p.234) argued that “Chinese 
state does not simply reflect the capitalist class’s interests. It is a field of class struggles 
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and its policies are simultaneously shaped by capital and labour.” The two equations, (3) 
and (5) support this claim. Labor strike frequency roughly represents the strength of the 
working class and private sector employment percentage roughly represents the strength 
of the capitalist class in the cities. It’s found that when the two classes’ strength is 
similar, their representation in five-year plans is similar. For example, in equation (3), 
when labor strike frequency is low and private sector employment percentage is low, the 
percentage differences between the strategies that benefit the capitalist and working class 
are low. When labor strike frequency is high and private sector employment percentage is 
high, the percentage differences between the two types of strategies are low. However, 
when the strength of the two classes differs, their representation in five-year plans 
become different and benefits distribution in the plans lean toward the stronger force. For 
example, in equation (5), when labor strike frequency is low and private sector 
employment percentage is high, the percentage differences between the strategies that 
benefit the capitalist and working class are high with the capitalists receiving more 
benefits.  
However, the two condition variables, labor strike frequency and private sector 
employment percentage, are not necessary nor sufficient for the outcome variable. When 
the cities’ economic situations change, the results of the two classes’ representation in the 
five-year plans change too. This supports the claim that economic changes can influence 
the power balance between labor and capital (Chan & Hui, 2017). Workers tend to gain 
more power to negotiate with capitalists when labor supply is low and demand is high. 
For example, in equation (1), high labor strike frequency and high private sector 
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employment produce similar representation of the two class in the five-year plans while 
in equation (2), high labor strike frequency and high private sector employment produce 
different representation of the two class. It’s because in equation (1), the high labor strike 
and private sector employment is accompanied by the presence of high economic growth 
while in equation (2), they are accompanied by the presence of low economic growth. It 
makes sense because when the economic growth is high, it can be assumed that the 
demand for labor is high. The economic situation can give workers more negotiation 
power so that they receive more attention and supports in the five-year plans. However, 
when the economic growth is low, assuming low labor demand, the capitalists can gain 
more power and receive more benefits in the five-year plans. 
 
Theoretical Connection 
As mentioned in the earlier section, most studies on Chinese capitalists have 
argued that in China, the capitalists are gaining more political influence since the 1990s 
at all levels of government especially at the local level (see Schubert & Heberer, 2017; 
Hong, 2015; Guangjin, 2013; Sol, 2013; Kennedy , 2009; Chen et al., 2008; Dickson, 
2007; Guiheux, 2006; Heberer, 2003). And this study makes connections to the Chinese 
capitalist theory in three ways. 
First, my research findings strengthen the validity of the theoretical claim that the 
Chinese capitalist class enjoys political privilege to influence policymaking for their own 
interests over other groups. In all of the 20 five-year plans analyzed, at the national, 
provincial, and city level, except in Yunnan province, there are more strategies 
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benefitting the capitalist class than the working class. For example, in the Twelfth 
national plan, there are 20.2% of all strategies that favor the capitalist class and 18.5% for 
the working class. In the Thirteenth national plan, 19.7% of all strategies focuses on the 
capitalist and 13.1% on the working class. At provincial level combing all 6 provinces’ 
strategies, there are 18.9% favoring the capitalists and 15.8% for the working class. At 
city level combining all 12 cities’ strategies, it’s 19.5% for the capitalists and 13.1% for 
the workers. In addition to the higher proportions that favor the capitalists in the plans, 
the central importance of industrial innovation in the economy from the private sector is 
emphasized in all of the Thirteenth five-year plans. The empirical findings from my study 
show that the industrial capitalist class do receive more attention and supports in the five-
year plans than the working class even though their interests don’t dominate the plan. 
However, the empirical evidence cannot prove it’s the capitalists who actually influenced 
the policy decision making of the Thirteenth five-year plans. It only makes the Chinese 
capitalist theory more convincing and encourages future researchers to examine the roles 
actually played by the capitalists in China during the five-year plan-making process.  
Second, my research findings do not support the theoretical claim that the 
political power of the Chinese capitalist class has been growing since 2010. In my study, 
a chi-square test of homogeneity was performed to compare the Twelfth (2011-2015) and 
Thirteenth (2016-2020) five-year plans’ class implication. With the p value bigger than 
0.05, the test result shows that the two plans’ class implications are homogenous. It 
means, compared the workers and the general public, the capitalist class doesn’t benefit 
more in the Thirteenth national plan than in the Twelfth national plan. Even though the 
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findings do not support the theoretical claim of the increasing political power of the 
capitalists in China, they cannot prove the claim is false. The political power can be 
observed in many political activities which include five-year plan making. The failed 
observation in one activity, the five-year plan making activity, doesn’t rule out the 
possibility of successful observations in other activities.  
Third, my research findings do not support the theoretical claim that Chinese 
capitalists are more active at the local level to safeguard and expand their interests than at 
higher levels such as at the provincial and national level. In my study, a chi-square test of 
homogeneity was performed to compare the national, provincial, and city plans’ class 
implications. With the p value bigger than 0.05, the test result shows that in the national, 
provincial, and city plans, the five-year plans’ class implications are homogenous. It 
means, compared the workers and the general public, the capitalist class doesn’t benefit 
more in the city Thirteenth Five-Year Plans than in the provincial and national plans. 
However, the empirical findings cannot prove the claim is false. Political participation 
and activeness can be observed in many activities which include five-year plan making. 
The fact that it’s not observed in the Thirteenth five-year plans doesn’t rule out the 













The fundamental promise and the goal of socialism in China is to provide 
common prosperity for all (Chang, 1996). Common prosperity entails eliminating poverty 
and extreme inequality between the rich and the poor. But after 40 years of economic 
reform, China has become one of the most unequal societies in the world (Jain-Chandra, 
et al., 2018). The President of China, Xi Jinping in 2017 declared that the principal social 
contradiction of China lies between people’s ever-growing demands for better lives and 
imbalanced and insufficient development. Briefly summarized, the imbalanced 
development refers to the economic disparities between the rural and urban regions, 
between the eastern, and the western and central regions, and the income and wealth gap 
between the rich and the poor in China. 
With the significant and increasing spatial, income, and wealth inequality, and the 
ever-growing size of the private sector in China since the 1980s, achieving common 
prosperity could face serious obstacles. In 2018, the private sector in China contributed 
about 60 percent of national GDP and brought in over 50% of the governmental fiscal 
revenue (Meng, 2018). Chen, Lu, and He (2008) argued that according to their survey, 
the capitalists in China were able to transform their economic power into formal political 
power. The power imbalance between the capitalists and the workers could lead to the 
domination of the capitalists in politics and prevent equitable policymaking to achieve 
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common prosperity. Thus, given the potential obstacles, the significance of imbalanced 
development in China, and the central role played by the Five-Year Plan in China’s social 
and economic development, it is important to evaluate whether the most recent five-year 
plans are true reflections of the socialism vision or in favor of the more powerful 
capitalists. 
Unfortunately, such critical and systematic examination of the Thirteenth Five-
Year Plans was not found in the current five-year plan literature. The five-year plan 
evaluation literature primarily compares what’s in the plan and what happened in reality, 
and pays little attention to the plan content itself (Gu & Wang, 2014). The potential social 
and spatial implications of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans have escaped academic 
scrutiny. And this study fills the gap by critically and systematically analyzing the goals 
and strategies of the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans at the national, provincial, and city level. 
The analysis in my study first reveals that all 19 Thirteenth Five-Year Plans do 
address the issue of imbalanced development. In the national plans, 20.6% strategies 
address imbalance. In the provincial plans, 17.6% strategies address imbalance. In the 
city plans, 15.9% strategies deal with the issue of imbalanced development. The chi-
square test shows that the strategy distributions between the provincial and city plans are 
identical and they are significantly different from the national plans. The proportion tests 
show that National plans have relatively and significantly more strategies that address 
imbalance than the provincial and city plans. With similar plan structure and plan 
strategies, it can be argued that the issue of imbalanced development is given more 
attention and emphasis in the national plans than in the provincial and city plans. 
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Concerns for regional issues mainly appear in the national plans and rarely exist in the 
provincial and city plans. The main difference between the two national plans, in terms of 
addressing imbalance, is that the farmers and rural areas are emphasized more in the 
Twelfth plan. In the Thirteenth plan, attention to their issues is switched to a more 
general concern of poverty and innovation. Different aspects of the issue are emphasized 
in the two plans. It’s hard to judge which of the two plans emphasizes the issue of 
imbalanced development more.   
Second all Thirteenth Five-Year plans have similar percentages of the goals and 
strategies that tend to reinforce and reduce imbalanced development. No one type of 
goals and strategies dominate the Thirteenth five-year plans. It means that certain goals 
and strategies mainly aim to benefit the low- and mid-income groups, the working class, 
the rural areas, and the western and central region, while others mainly support the 
capitalists, the urban centers, and the eastern region. For example, in the National 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plan, 21.0% strategies tend to reduce the imbalanced development 
while 23.5% tend to reinforce it. In the provincial plans 18.7% strategies among 811 
strategies, tend to reduce imbalance while 21.7% tend to reinforce it. In the city plans 
15.9% strategies among 1001 strategies tend to reduce imbalance while 19.4% tend to 
reinforce it. Comparing the plans across the three levels, the chi-square tests and 
proportion tests show that the national five-year plans have the highest proportions of the 
strategies that tend to reduce imbalance. The provincial and city plans do not differ in 
terms of their proportion of the strategies that tend to reduce the imbalance. The tests also 
show that the Thirteenth five-year plans across the three levels, do not differ significantly 
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in terms of their proportions of the strategies that tend to reinforce imbalance. The key 
reason for the higher percentages of the strategies that tend to reduce imbalance in the 
national plans is that only in the national plans the regional disparities are dealt with.  
Third the regional imbalance is addressed in the Thirteenth National Five-Year 
Plan. However, only 10.3% strategies are related to regional issues. Among the 25 
strategies that do have regional implications, 48.0% support the development of the 
western and central region, and 40.0% tend to benefit the eastern region. The guidance 
for the three regions’ development is shared for the most part by the Twelfth and 
Thirteenth National Five-Year Plan. The main difference between the two lies in the 
emphasis of economic opening, connection, innovation, and the implications of the Road 
and the Belt Initiative in the Thirteenth National plan.  
Fourth all Thirteenth Five-Year Plans address the rural and urban imbalance. Key 
words “rural” or “urban” is identified in 19.3% strategies proposed in the National 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plans. 53.2% strategies directly benefit the rural areas. 36.2% 
strategies benefit the urban areas, and 10.6% benefit both areas. In provincial plans, key 
words “rural” or “urban” is identified in 19.6% strategies. Among these strategies, 57.9% 
benefit the rural areas. 27.0% benefit the urban areas, and 15.1% of the strategies support 
both areas. In city plans, 29.7% strategies have clear urban and rural implications. 
Among them, 37.7% benefit the rural areas. 17.8% benefit the urban areas, and 30.0% 
support both areas. Consistent across the national, provincial, and city plans, there are 
more strategies benefiting the rural areas than the urban areas. At least judging from the 
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percentages, the analysis shows that the rural areas were given more attention and 
supports in the national plans than in the provincial and city plans. 
In the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans, the deemphasis of the farmers and rural areas is 
evident when compared with the National Twelfth Five-Year Plan. In the Twelfth 
national plan, there are 40 (23.8%) strategies in which key words “rural” or “urban” are 
identified. Among the 40 strategies, 60.0% benefit the rural areas. 20.0% benefit the 
urban areas, and 20.0% benefit both areas. The 60.0% is higher than national Thirteenth 
five-year plan’s 53.2%, provincial plans’ 57.9%, and city plans’ 37.7%.  
Fifth the Marxist class analysis shows that the biggest policy beneficiary group in 
the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans is the general public. About 65% of all strategies in the 
five-year plans serve the interest of the general public. The second biggest beneficiary 
group is the capitalist class. There are slightly more strategies directly benefiting the 
capitalist class than the working class in national, provincial, and city Thirteenth Five-
Year Plans. However, the percentage of the strategies that have clear class implications 
only account for about 35% of all strategies. For example, in the Thirteenth National 
Five-Year Plan, 19.3% strategies directly benefit the capitalist class while 13.1% favor 
the working class. 67.5% strategies serve the interests of the general public. These 
strategies have no clear class implications for the two classes and no key words were 
identified. In the provincial plans, 18% strategies directly benefit the capitalist class while 
16.1% benefit the working class. 62.5% strategies do not favor any class and broadly 
benefit the general public. In the city plans, 19.5% strategies directly benefit the capitalist 
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class while 13.1% directly benefit the working class. 723 (72.2%) strategies do not favor 
any class and broadly benefit the interests of the general public. 
Comparing the Thirteenth national and provincial plans, it’s found that the plans’ 
class implication distributions are not significantly different. The chi-square test supports 
the claim that compared the workers and the general public, the capitalist class doesn’t 
benefit significantly more in the provincial plans than in the national plan. 
Comparing the provincial Thirteenth Five-Year plans of eastern, central, and 
western region in terms of their class implications, it’s found that their class implication 
distributions are significantly different. The chi-square test and proportion tests show that 
the provincial plans of the eastern region have relatively more strategies that directly 
benefit the capitalist class than both the plans of the western and central region. It means 
judging from plan strategies’ percentages, the capitalist class benefits significantly more 
in the eastern region’s provincial plans than in the western and central region’s provincial 
plans.  
The eastern region has been the most developed region among the three regions 
since the 1980s. It has the largest and most energetic private sector among the three 
regions. The capitalist class has strongest bases in the Eastern region. The finding 
strengthens the validity of Marx’s base-superstructure argument. Marx’s base-
superstructure argument goes like this, “the sum total of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal 
and political superstructure” (Marx & Engels, 1958, p.362-363). With the transformation 
of the socialist economy to a mixed economy in the eastern region and the tremendous 
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growth of the private sector, the production relations have been changed from purely 
socialistic to a mixed one in which capitalist production relation is playing a more and 
more important role. Planning decision is a part of the legal and political superstructure 
which can reflect the changes in the superstructure. And my analysis shows that the 
changes in the superstructure in the eastern regions are very likely has happened because 
the capitalist class benefit more in the eastern region than in both the western and central 
region. However, this finding cannot prove that the capitalists are gaining more political 
power. Future direct observation and interview studies of politics in China is needed to 
prove this.  
Comparing the plans of the high economic performance provinces with the plans 
of the low ones’ plans, defined by their GDP, GDP per capita, and the percentage of the 
workforce employed by the private industrial sector, it’s found that their class implication 
distributions are homogenous. It means, compared the workers and the general public, the 
capitalist class doesn’t benefit more in the high-performance provinces’ plans than in the 
low-performance provinces’ plans. Connecting to the finding that the capitalist class 
benefits more in the eastern region’s plans than in the western and central region’s plans, 
my analysis suggests that the regional division could have more predicting power than 
the pure economic factors for capitalists’ political influence.   
Comparing the national, provincial, and city plans, it’s found that the plans’ class 
implication distributions are not significantly different across the three levels. This 
finding casts doubt on the claim that Chinese capitalists are more active at the local level 
to safeguard and expand their interests than at higher levels such as provincial and 
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national level. At least in the 19 Thirteenth five-year plans analyzed, the capitalists do not 
enjoy more benefits in the city plans than in the provincial and national plans.  
Comparing the high economic performance cities with the low ones, the chi-
square test shows that their class implication distributions are homogenous. Comparing 
city plans of the eastern, central, and western region in terms of their class implications, 
the chi-square test suggests that their class implication distributions are not significantly 
different. These findings suggest that city five-year plans are relatively homogenous 
across regions and economic levels.  
To conclude, my research reveals that following the trend in the Eleventh and 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan, China’s Thirteenth Five-Year Plans do intend to address the 
issue of imbalanced development. The biggest policy target group is the general public 
because in over 60% of all strategies, no specific social groups or spatial areas were 
identified. The five-year plans’ social implication is that there are slightly more goals and 
strategies benefiting the capitalist class than the working class. However, neither the 
capitalist nor working class interests dominate the plans. This finding suggests that one of 
the reasons why the income and wealth gap between the rich and the poor in China 
remains significant could be that the capitalist class has been receiving substantial and 
constant supports from the government more than the working class. The five-year plans’ 
spatial implication is that though spatial issues are not of central importance, there are 
much more goals and strategies benefitting the rural areas than the urban areas, and more 
goals and strategies benefitting the western and central regions than the eastern regions. 
This finding suggests that spatial planning in China prioritizes reducing spatial inequality. 
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Overall, in the Thirteenth Five-Year Plans, Chinese governments actively sought to deal 
with the issue of imbalanced development. The next logical step for future research is to 
examine how the goals and strategies proposed to reduce imbalance were implemented. 
Theoretically, my research findings strengthen the validity of the claim that Chinese 
capitalist class enjoys political privilege to influence policymaking for their own class 
interests over the working class. They also support the Marxist claim that class struggle 
plays a vital role in public policymaking in China. However, my research findings do not 
support the claim that the political power of Chinese capitalist class has been growing 
since 2010 in China, and do not support the claim that Chinese capitalists are more active 
at the local level to safeguard and expand their interests than at higher levels such as at 
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